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INTRODUCTION 
In the more than half-century of civil strife in Colombia, there has been a 
constant ebb and flow in the sharing of power between the Government and rebel 
groups, the largest of which is the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—
Ejército del Pueblo (FARC).1 The FARC is a highly structured group controlled by a 
designated hierarchy, said to have encompassed as much as 17,000 fighters at its 
peak in the early 2000s.2 While the FARC has exercised total control of national 
territory only for quite small areas during limited periods, it has been a dominant 
presence in more than half of Colombian municipalities over long periods of time. 
In those areas of mixed control, the population has had to navigate between 
governance de abajo (from below, in the plains) emanating from state institutions, 
and governance de arriba (from above, in the hills) emanating from the FARC. The 
latter adopted a dual strategy of instrumentalization and neutralization, attempting 
to infiltrate official institutions to co-opt them to follow a line dictated by the rebels 
or, failing that, impeding the operations of these institutions. As a result, the FARC 
has been involved, in a period of time extending over several decades, in the 
management of a wide array of social issues, including labor relations, commerce, 
family life, taxation, and much more.3 One facet of this rebel governance has been 
the administration of justice. It appears that FARC judicial institutions grew out of 
internal disciplinary mechanisms, commonly established by non-state armed groups 
to ensure tactical effectiveness.4 This Article, relying on recent ethnographic 
research by anthropologists and sociologists in Colombia as well as my own field 
work, will map out the emergence and evolution of these FARC “courts” with a 
view to appraise the extent to which they correspond in any meaningful manner to 
the concept of the judicial function. This will in turn serve to interrogate, relying on 
the insights of legal pluralism, the concept of the rule of law that is embodied in 
international legal instruments in the fields of international human rights and 
international humanitarian law. Unpacking the idea of the rule of law applicable in 
situations of armed conflict, I argue that a cogent concept of the rebel rule of law 
can be articulated to serve as yardstick to measure and guide insurgents in their legal 
governance. 
I. REBEL GOVERNANCE AND LEGAL PLURALISM 
The very notion of civil war brings associations of the chaotic displacement of 
normal social structures, challenged by insurgent forces set on overcoming all 
resistance to its rise, whether in the form of armed opposition or in the operation 
 
1. ANA ARJONA, REBELOCRACY: SOCIAL ORDER IN THE COLOMBIAN CIVIL WAR 89, 91, 96–
97 (Margaret Levi et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2016). 
2. Id. at 96–97. 
3. Id. at 180–86. 
4. See infra Section II.B. 
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of other state institutions. When a rebel group is said to have taken control of a 
territory, the evocation is more often than not the imposition of absolute authority 
through raw, barely controlled violence—actual or threatened. Social institutions 
that normally ensure stability in human relations are destroyed or displaced, leaving 
the civilian population in a position of acute vulnerability and powerlessness vis-à-
vis the ruling non-state armed group. The image is of an all-powerful, non-state 
actor unilaterally imposing its will through violence upon a civilian population 
deprived of any real agency. This vision corresponds to—and indeed is fueled by—
a characterization of non-state armed groups as criminals or terrorists, typically 
conveyed in government narratives about non-international armed conflicts. 
This may be a common evocation of rebel control over a territory and 
population, one commonly pictured in Hollywood representations of civil wars, but 
for a very long time it has been known to be factually inaccurate. We can see in 
classic works on insurgency by Mao and Che Guevara the relation of dependence 
that is posited between a rebel group and the population on which it must 
necessarily rely if it is to survive and succeed.5 Hannah Arendt in her essay, On 
Violence, noted: “No government exclusively based on means of violence has ever 
existed”; drawing a link to guerrilla warfare and the limits of military domination 
from the Napoleonic invasion of Spain to the Vietnam war, she argued that violence 
can destroy power but can never be politically productive in creating power.6 This 
has been repeated and analyzed often in relation to state power, but the dominant 
view remains what Mampilly describes as a “Hobbesian conjecture”—only the state 
can wield power to bring about order in society.7 If the state’s power is challenged 
and undermined, then order is accordingly undermined, ultimately leading to chaos. 
In fact, sociological studies of non-international armed conflict indicate that life 
largely remains orderly for most people, most of the time, in most places affected 
by war.8 How can this be so, if the state’s power is partially or completely displaced 
by insurgency? 
The emerging field of rebel governance suggests that non-state armed groups 
fill, to some extent, the vacuum of power created by the state’s retreat.9 Armed 
groups do so not merely or even mostly by way of violence but rather by using 
approaches that are not entirely dissimilar to governance by the state.10 In some 
situations of non-international armed conflict, but not in all, the rebels do become 
 
5. See CHE GUEVARA, GUERRILLA WARFARE: THE AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION (1968); MAO 
ZEDONG, SELECTED MILITARY WRITINGS OF MAO TSE-TUNG X (Foreign Languages Press Peking, 
2d ed. 1966). 
6. HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 50–51, 56 (1970). 
7. ZACHARIAH CHERIAN MAMPILLY, REBEL RULERS: INSURGENT GOVERNANCE AND 
CIVILIAN LIFE DURING WAR 7 (Cornell Univ. Press 2011). 
8. ARJONA, supra note 1, at 2, 21–22; id. 
9. See REBEL GOVERNANCE IN CIVIL WAR (Ana Arjona et al. eds., 2015). 
10. MAMPILLY, supra note 7, at 1–2; id. at 10, 77–78. 
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the providers of public goods.11 One fundamental public good that armed groups 
often provide is security, sometimes against violence at the hand of the government, 
and other times to suppress criminal behavior that may be unrelated to the conflict. 
In some non-international armed conflicts, such as the long-lasting civil war in Sri 
Lanka, the insurgents provided a wide array of public goods from health care to 
education, land allocation, and trade regulation.12 Again, contrary to widely held 
assumptions, in some instances rebels institutionalize the provision of such public 
goods.13 In periods of civil war, state institutions can become weaker and disappear, 
but that does not mean that no institution can arise to replace them. Armed conflict 
itself corresponds to a vision of violence that is institutionalized: it is a condition of 
applicability of international humanitarian law that hostilities take place between 
armed forces that either belong to a state (presumed institutionalized) or non-state 
armed groups “which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a 
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol.”14 The requirements of “responsible 
command” and “sustained and concerted military operations” correspond to a 
group institutionalized to some degree. War, as we understand it, is an activity that 
is organized and institutionalized to a significant degree so it should not come as a 
radical suggestion that aspects of insurgency other than the conduct of armed 
hostilities should be institutionalized as well. Ana Arjona has offered one of the first 
institutional analyses of rebel governance and found that, in some non-international 
armed conflicts, armed opposition groups broadened their grasp on public 
governance so much that it came to correspond to what she terms “rebelocracy,” 
that is the establishment of a government by the rebels that mirrors that of the 
official government of the state.15 She contrasts this to “aliocracy,” a more common 
 
11. See MAMPILLY, supra note 7, at 1–2, 4–5; REBEL GOVERNANCE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 
9, at 1. 
12. Ana Arjona, Wartime Institutions: A Research Agenda, 58 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1360, 1377 
(2014). 
13. REBEL GOVERNANCE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 9, at 77. 
14. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. I, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol II ] . The requirement related to the organised nature of the armed 
groups is not stated but is implied in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. It is also echoed in the references to ‘organized resistance movements’ 
and responsible command in the definition of prisoners of war in Article 4 of the 1949 Third Geneva 
Convention, Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135, and in the definition of armed forces in Article 43(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 43(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [ hereinafter 
Additional Protocol I ] . 
15. ARJONA, supra note 1, at 170–92; Arjona, supra note 12, at 1360–89. 
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situation in which there will be some degree of coexistence between the authority 
and institutions of non-state armed groups and those of the state and other agents.16 
One of the most important public goods that the state provides is the 
administration of justice—both by way of adopting legal standards and by enforcing 
them through institutions like the police and the judiciary. Is it conceivable that, in 
the context of a non-international armed conflict, a non-state armed group would 
take it upon itself to enact its own “laws” and run its own “courts”? The burgeoning 
field of rebel governance does include the administration of justice as an object of 
study, but so far the analysis has been carried out from the perspective of disciplines 
other than law.17 To what extent are the scare quotes around the words “laws” and 
“courts” justified, in view of legal concepts that correspond to these labels? The 
question is, in significant ways, definitional rather than ontological. Most jurists 
today embrace a positivist concept of law that rests on four precepts: monism (the 
claim that law is a unified, coherent regime); centralism (associating the power to 
validly create legal standards with state sovereignty); positivism (viewing law as 
ontologically distinguished from fact, thus allowing the systematic delineation of the 
frontier of legality to reflect pre-existing legal standards); and prescriptivism (offering 
legal norms as external constraints descending upon legal agents to try to modify 
patterns of behavior).18 Adopting such a perspective, it becomes readily evident that 
norms adopted by non-state armed groups are not properly labelled as “law,” and 
institutions that they create to interpret and enforce these norms are not “courts.” 
This mainstream perspective on law and legal institutions is systematically adopted 
by governments confronted with armed opposition groups that claim to establish 
judicial bodies.19 For example, it informs the answer given by the Sri Lankan Chief 
Justice, Sarath de Silva, to the question of the character of courts set up by the 
LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) armed group in that country: 
These courts are not consistent with our constitution and they cannot exist 
under our hierarchy. Our courts are fully functional in those areas and we 
do not recognise any other courts. The people too should not go there [. . .] 
We must maintain our courts because that is what holds for governance. 
Legal systems, courts, police are all incidence of governance. If there is an 
erosion then there is no state. This is the danger of it.20 
 
16. Arjona, supra note 12, at 1375. 
17. Id. at 1389. 
18. Roderick A. Macdonald & David Sandomierski, Against Nomopolies, 57 N. IR. LEGAL  
Q. 610, 615 (2006); Roderick A. Macdonald, Here, There . . . and Everywhere: Theorizing Legal Pluralism; 
Theorizing Jacques Vanderlinden, in ÉTUDIER ET ENSEIGNER LE DROIT: HIER, AUJOURD’HUI ET 
DEMAIN–ÉTUDES OFFERTES À JACQUES VANDERLINDEN 381, 412 ( Yvon Blais ed., 2006). 
19. Laila Nasry, LTTE Has No Judicial Authority – CJ, SUNDAY TIMES (Sri Lanka), Nov. 14, 
2004, http://sundaytimes.lk/021208/news/courts.html [ https://perma.cc/USW9-NAL5]. 
20. Id. 
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While the politics of a government objecting to any characterization of 
insurgent courts that would endow legitimacy upon a rebel group are readily 
understandable, such a stance does correspond to an abdication by the legal 
profession of its capacity to use the conceptual tools of law to better understand 
this practice. In other words, a blanket declaration of illegality means that no 
distinction can be drawn between practices that are worse violations of basic 
principles of law than others. Concerns about due process and international human 
rights generally are relegated to futile distinctions, like rearranging deck chairs on 
the Titanic. 
While positivism warrants a narrow focus on state-driven normativity, legal 
pluralism, on the contrary, explodes the limits of our conception of law to 
encompass forms of normativity beyond those connected to the state in any way. 
According to a pluralistic understanding, law is fragmented (with no necessary 
coherence across law as a whole), decentralized (where many centers and processes 
exist to create and interpret law), contingent (norms do not exist a priori but emerge 
from an engagement with the particular circumstances of their invocation, including 
agents and context), and deliberative (law is not so much a series of commands as a 
space in which meaning is collectively created in relation to social practices).21 
Detached from common institutional features linked to the state, legal normativity 
appears more malleable and variable according to particular contexts, cultural, and 
other.22 Pluralism, when turning its gaze upon itself, calls for a rejection of any 
essentialist definition of law, and thus can accommodate state- and non-state-
centered normativity.23 More than an acknowledgment that there are different 
normative regimes operating simultaneously in any given time and place, legal 
pluralism attempts to articulate the ways in which these different legal regimes 
intersect and interact.24 Seeing this, legal pluralism emerges as an especially 
promising perspective for the analysis of the administration of justice by insurgents. 
This is so both because such norms and practices do not derive any legitimacy from 
the state, quite the opposite, but also because in many if not most civil wars the 
official law of the state will cohabit with norms established by armed opposition 
groups. Viewed in this way, insurgent jurisprudence appears as legal pluralism 
incarnate. 
 
21. I have discussed the implications of legal pluralism for international law more fully in Rene 
Provost, Interpretation in International Law as a Transcultural Project, in INTERPRETATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 290–308 (Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor eds., 2015). 
22. Macdonald & Sandomierski, supra note 18, at 620–22, 625–27 (2006). 
23. Macdonald, supra note 18, at 403. 
24. Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1238 (2007). 
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II. REBEL JUSTICE IN COLOMBIA 
In the limited literature on rebel governance, when the administration of 
justice is examined, two cases are always mentioned as amounting to unusually 
developed insurgent legal regimes: Sri Lanka and Colombia.25 Likewise, in the 
handful of international law studies that have discussed the creation of courts by 
non-state armed groups, the same two countries are often brought up as vignettes 
of how far this practice can be developed.26 In this Article, I aim to go beyond the 
small vignette and delve deeper into the reality of rebel administration of justice by 
the FARC in Colombia, to tease out whether in such a practice we can discern legal 
norms and judicial institutions as understood using the insights of legal pluralism. I 
start by situating the conflict and presenting the governance structure of the FARC 
in Section A before turning to its legal system per se in Section B. 
A. The Civil War in Colombia and FARC Governance 
The origins and evolution of the conflict in Colombia are briefly sketched as 
a background to the presentation of the FARC’s general governance structure and 
institutions. Both provide context to the discussion of the administration of justice 
by the FARC in the following section. 
i. The Civil War in Colombia 
The Colombian armed conflict has its roots in the period referred to as La 
Violencia, a civil war that started with the assassination of the presidential candidate 
Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948.27 This era of Colombian history was marked by 
violence between the two traditional parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, 
carried out by self-defense militias, guerrillas, and criminal organizations.28 The 
conflict originated in disputes over land and political agendas. Although there have 
been several stages in this conflict, it never ceased completely. Early in the history 
of the conflict, guerrilla groups came to emerge, including the FARC, the Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional (ELN), and the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL).29 They were 
later joined by right-wing paramilitary groups or Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
 
25. MAMPILLY, supra note 7, at 116–17; REBEL GOVERNANCE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 9, at 
189. I leave a closer study of Sri Lanka for another segment of this project. 
26. Sandesh Sivakumaran, Courts of Armed Opposition Groups: Fair Trials or Summary Justice?, 
7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 489, 493 (2009). 
27. 1 GERMÁN GUZMÁN CAMPOS, ORLANDO FALS BORDA & EDUARDO UMAÑA LUNA, LA 
VIOLENCIA EN COLOMBIA X (2005); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAR WITHOUT QUARTER: 
COLOMBIA AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 136 (1998); MARY ROLDÁN, BLOOD AND 
FIRE: LA VIOLENCIA IN ANTIOQUIA, COLOMBIA, 1946–1953 X (2002); Maria Cristina Cardenas, 
Colombia’s Peace Process: The Continuous Search for Peace, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 273, 298 (2002). 
28. Norman Offstein, An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian Guerrilla Movements: 
FARC, ELN and EPL, 52 DESARROLLO Y SOCIEDAD 99, 101 (2003). 
29. Id. at 104. 
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(AUC).30 Throughout the civil war, criminal groups, referred to as the bandas 
criminales (BACRIM) or drug lords, operated across the conflict zones.31 
The FARC has been involved in the Colombian conflict in its current form 
since 1966.32 Although the emergence of the FARC is commonly associated with 
the apparition of the Bloque Sur (Southern Bloc) in 1964, its roots can be traced to 
the period of La Violencia (the Violence) and resistance carried out by Autodefensas 
Campesinas (peasant self-defense organizations).33 At its origins, proclaiming itself 
“the revolutionary army” of Colombia, the movement received support from the 
Colombian Communist Party and the USSR.34 Autodefensas Campesinas’ main goals 
were to fight poverty in agricultural regions of Colombia and improve peasants’ 
quality of life.35 
From the late 1960s to mid-1970s, the government carried out important 
investments in the rural agricultural sector, with a significant impact on peasant 
well-being.36 These investments in rural areas, combined with a changing 
international context, significantly weakened support for the FARC and other 
guerrilla groups.37 As a result, in the mid-1970s, the FARC became involved in drug 
trafficking, a pattern which intensified in the 1980s. Reportedly, the FARC ensured 
their financial viability through involvement in coca growing, drug trafficking, 
kidnapping, and extortion.38 Peace talks were initiated by the government leading 
to both parties to agree to a cease-fire, but it was never respected.39 After this failed 
agreement, some commentators argue that the FARC abandoned its commitment 
to the best interest of the people and the revolution, and turned instead to 
profiteering.40 That said, despite internal dissensions, the membership of the FARC 
increased tremendously, from three to twenty-seven fronts between 1974 and 
 
30. Constantin von der Groeben, The Conflict in Colombia and the Relationship Between 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Practice: Analysis of the New Operational Law of the 
Colombian Armed Forces, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 141, 143 (2011). 
31. Id. 
32. Offstein, supra note 28, at 103. 
33. Id. 
34. Breanne Hataway, The FARC’s Drug Trafficking as Political Crime: Determining the Success 
of Colombia’s Peace Talks, 41 N.C.J. INT’L L. 163, 167 (2015); Offstein, supra note 28, at 103. 
35. Arturo Carrillo-Suarez, Hors de Logique: Contemporary Issues in International Humanitarian 
Law as Applied to Internal Armed Conflict, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 14 (1999). 
36. Offstein, supra note 28, at 106. 
37. Id. at 105. 
38. Hataway, supra note 34. 
39. JUNE S. BEITTEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42982, PEACE TALKS IN COLOMBIA (2014). 
40. Offstein, supra note 28, at 111. 
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1984.41 The number of FARC fighters then grew from an estimated 3,600 in 1986, 
to about 17,000 around the year 2000, down again to about 7000 at present.42 
The 1990s was the bloodiest decade of the civil war in Colombia. Even though 
the government agreed to a new constitution, the FARC did not settle or 
demobilize.43 The FARC did try to enter the political arena, but “their attempt to 
participate in politics ended in disaster when their political party, the Patriotic 
Union, ‘faced an extermination campaign by right-wing paramilitary groups and 
extreme elements within the state, particularly the military.’”44 In 2000, the United 
States officially got involved in the Colombian conflict with ‘Plan Colombia’: 
initiated by Colombian President Andrés Pastrana and U.S. President Bill Clinton. 
With an allocation of $1.3 billion from the United States, Plan Colombia was 
intended to stop drug trafficking.45 That said, the fight against the insurgency, 
especially against the FARC, was a key component, with U.S. special units training 
the Colombian military in counterinsurgency tactics.46 As a consequence, the FARC 
was pushed further in the Colombian jungle. The government attempted another 
round of peace talks with the FARC, which failed in 2002. Nonetheless, Colombia 
did reach an agreement with right-wing paramilitary groups, which demobilized 
between 2003 and 2006.47 
The latest peace negotiations began in August 2012, with the signing of the 
General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and Building of a Stable 
and Long-Lasting Peace (Havana Accord).48 The Havana Accord sets out six 
agenda items for the talks: (1) integrated agricultural development policy; (2) 
political participation for the FARC; (3) ceasefire and disarmament; (4) the problem 
of drugs trafficking; (5) reparation for victims; and (6) implementation, verification, 
and ratification by the Colombian People.49 The negotiations progressed steadily 
and a general ceasefire agreement was reached in June 2016. The narrow rejection 
of a proposed accord by referendum in Colombia in October 2016 was one more 
 
41. MARIO AGUILERA PEÑA, CONTRAPODER Y JUSTICIA GUERRILLERA: FRAGMENTACIÓN 
POLÍTICA Y ORDEN INSURGENTE EN COLOMBIA (1952–2003) 243 (2014); Hataway, supra note 34, at 
168. 
42. JONATHAN D. ROSEN, THE LOSING WAR: PLAN COLOMBIA AND BEYOND (2014). The 
estimated size of the troops from year to year is available at: Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Columbia - People’s Army, STAN. U., https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/
groups/view/89 [ https://perma.cc/N9MU-S5K5] ( last updated Aug. 15, 2015). 
43. Hataway, supra note 34, at 168. 
44. Id. 
45. Catherine C. LeGrand, The Colombian Crisis in Historical Perspective, 28 CAN. J. LATIN  
AM. & CARIBBEAN STUD. 165, 166 (2003). 
46. Id. 
47. Hataway, supra note 34, at 168; Enzo Nussio, Learnings from Shortcomings: The 
Demobilisation of Paramilitaries in Colombia, 6 J. PEACEBUILDING & DEV. 88, 88 (2011). 
48. Hataway, supra note 34, at 164. 
49. Id. at 164–65. 
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hurdle before a final peace agreement between Colombia and the FARC was 
approved by the close of 2016.50 
ii. FARC Governance 
From the formation of the FARC in 1964 until 2008, Manuel Marulanda 
Vélez, (also known as “Tirofijo”—meaning sure shot) acted as the supreme leader 
of the FARC.51 The FARC was very well organized, with a highly centralized 
command.52 Marulanda and his companions commanded the FARC from what they 
called the General Secretariat.53 This organ of the FARC was composed of “seven 
individuals, each responsible for specific regions or duties, like international 
outreach. In addition, the FARC has a Estado Mayor (General Staff )  responsible for 
military operations and the bloques (blocks), which join several fronts as regional 
forces.”54 In 1997, it was estimated that there were sixty-two rural fronts, three 
urban fronts, and nine elite units, mirroring the army’s specialized 
counterinsurgency brigade.55 The Statutes of the group reveal that the organization 
of the FARC is modelled on that of the military.56 Although block commanders 
were dispersed throughout the country, often in remote regions far away from the 
reach of the central FARC administration, Marulanda and the General Secretariat 
are said to have maintained tight control over these units so as to determine the 
group’s general strategy.57 Marulanda died in 2008, and the current leader of the 
FARC is Timoleón Jiménez, also known as Timochenko. 
Governance over a population by a non-state armed groups is said to 
correspond to three fundamental goals: “(1) defend the populace from foreign 
enemies, (2) maintain internal peace and order, and (3) make contributions to the 
material security of the population.”58 The FARC did not deviate from this model, 
adopting a strategy of doble poder o poder de dos caras (dual strategy)59 of 
 
50. Julia Symmes Cobb & Nicholas Casey, Colombia Vote Overturns Deal to End Its War,  
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2016, at A1. The peace process is monitored at COLUMBIA PEACE,  
http://colombiapeace.org [ https://perma.cc/WGE2-44UE] (last updated May 26, 2018). 
51. JAMES J. BRITTAIN, REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL CHANGE IN COLOMBIA: THE ORIGIN AND 
DIRECTION OF THE FARC-EP 14 (2010); Simon Romero, Manuel Marulanda, Top Commander of 
Colombia’s Largest Guerrilla Group, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2008, at B6. 
52. BRITTAIN, supra note 51, at 27. 
53. Carrillo-Suarez, supra note 35, at 13. 
54. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 27, at 137. 
55. Id. at 137. 
56. FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA, ESTATUTO (2013),  
http://farc-ep.co/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Estatutos.pdf [ https://perma.cc/8FAF-9EF4]. 
57. Elena M. Valencia, Theories of Compliance in International Conflict: The Place of the Third 
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instrumentalization and marginalization: they would try to infiltrate state 
institutions to gain a legal protection and orient measures taken to improve the 
population’s well-being, and at the same time try to impede the State credibility by 
showing its lack of legitimacy and limited capacity.60 Colombia in fact had quite 
strong state institutions, and government agencies could still operate even where 
the rebels “own[ed] the monopoly over the use of violence.”61 The Colombian 
guerrillas rarely developed state structures as such. Indeed, Arjona argues that: 
In general, armed actors in Colombia do not directly engage in the creation 
of health or education systems as insurgents have done in other countries. 
Instead, they usually influence how local government officials provide 
those services, and sometimes fund certain projects. Armed groups 
frequently gave orders to mayors and council members directing 
expenditures of public funds for infrastructure, education, or health 
projects.62 
Moreover, the same author posits that, “[w]ith a few exceptions, neither the 
guerrillas nor the paramilitaries sought to dismantle the formal local government 
altogether. Rather, they tried to control it by forcibly intervening in its decisions, 
capturing it through the appointment of their own members or allies, or both.”63 
That said, in some rural communities where the State was basically absent, such as 
in San Vicente del Caguán (Caquetá department) during the 1970s, the FARC 
became “the de facto ruler, intervening in social, political, and economic activities, 
and regulating many types of conducts.”64 The FARC went “to the locality 
peacefully, telling the community they were there to protect it.”65 
The degree to which the FARC and other armed opposition groups could 
exert authority over a population varied from place to place. This political 
geography of power was translated into the FARC’s own territorial organization 
within what were called zonas de retaguardia (rearguard zones).66 There were two 
types of zonas de retaguardias. The first one was the area next to the battle front, 
 
60. Id. at 108 (“Con sus ambigüedades o dualidades, los contrapoderes han significado un reto 
para el Estado, en tanto que estos pararon de ser únicos, marginales y muy locales (germinales o de 
Resistencia) a multiplicarse y formar verdaderas franjas de control compartido entre el Estado y la 
guerrilla, llegando a ofrecer una imagen creciente de fragmentación y de colapso del Estado.”). 
61. Arjona, supra note 12, at 1370. 
62. Ana Arjona, Civilian Resistance to Rebel Governance, in REBEL GOVERNANCE IN CIVIL 
WAR, supra note 9, at 180, 190 (2015). 
63. Id. 
64. In this community: 
Most interviewees agreed that civilians had little autonomy vis-à-vis the rebels. “The control 
that the armed actor had when I arrived here was total”, said a community leader who came 
in 1980. Nevertheless, locals found ways to communicate their preferences to FARC 
commanders and influence some of the ways in which things were done. 
Id. at 192. 
65. Id. at 193. 
66. PEÑA, supra note 41. 
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which served as a refuge or a place to regain forces, also called the frente guerrilleros 
(guerrilla front). The second was the retaguardia nacional (national rearguard zone), 
which was chosen in light of the political and social capital that could be developed 
in an area or in view of the pre-existing influence of communist groups in the 
1950s.67 The latter areas were essential to propagate the revolution, secure FARC 
influence on the population, and militarily defend the movement. Once a zone was 
well controlled it could qualify as a zona liberada (liberated area). Such a qualification 
would have been the achievement of the first step of the revolution, and indicate 
that the group had taken a step further in the revolutionary process.68 The next step 
would have been for the population to take control of their land and, with the 
guerrilla, carry out an offensive against the central government.69 This stage in fact 
was never reached by any rebel group in Colombia—there were areas controlled by 
insurgents, but never completely liberated areas.70 Although the FARC was never 
truly capable of developing zonas liberadas, it did develop frentes guerrilleros and, 
more importantly, it developed retarguardia nacional that was undoubtedly more 
stable and long-lasting than that of other guerrilla groups in the country.71 
FARC governance during the civil war was thus always intertwined with other 
sources of governance. In that respect, the Juntas de Acción Comunal ( JAC) are 
important local organizations when it comes to understanding what role the 
Government was playing in contested zones or zones under the control of the 
FARC.72 The JAC are peasants organizations that were established by the State in 
order to give local communities representatives that could dialogue with the central 
government.73 In addition, the JAC normally run conciliation committees, 
communal dispute-resolution mechanisms that are often the first place local people 
turn to when seeking justice. Although established by the state, the JAC remained 
independent of the government to some degree, and acted as interlocutors in 
communications with both the state and non-state armed groups.74 Created by the 
 
67. Id. at 93. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 94–95. They were located in the departments of Meta, Guaviare, Putumayo and 
Caquetá, and lasted broadly from 1980 to 2003. 
72. Id. at 93. 
73. Id. at 96. 
74. Id. at 99 (“[L]as juntas en esas condiciones no quedaron subordinadas a la insurgencia ni 
entraron a formar parte del organigrama político de los aparatos armados. Las JAC compartían los 
mimos espacios de las guerrillas, realizaban actividades complementarias de gobierno y de justicia, pero 
generalmente actuaban con independencia en la adopción de planes y programas para cubrir las 
necesidades de las veredas, en los desarrollos de sus comités de trabajo y en sus gestiones ante las 
autoridades regionales. Las JAC serían el Gobierno en algunas zonas controladas por las guerrillas y 
estas asumirían el papel coactivo. Las JAC eran el eje común entre la comunidad y la guerrilla, y estas 
no se atreverían por regla general a imponer sus punto sin alterar las reglas de juego democráticas que 
predominan en la vida interna de dichos organismos.”). 
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state and imposed as a vehicle for official governance, the JAC were nevertheless 
also supported by the FARC.75 The JAC remained mostly independent from the 
FARC, but in rural regions where the FARC had a strong influence, they typically 
maintained a close relationship. In some cases, the FARC infiltrated the JAC as a 
way of ensuring their collaboration. Conversely, FARC respect for the JAC 
enhances its credentials in the eyes of the population.76 
All forms of governance imply some element of power and repression, and 
governance by non-state armed groups is no exception.77 The FARC, like all 
guerrilla groups, imposed rules not only on its own members to maintain discipline 
but also on civilians to direct their behaviors, regulating issues such as free speech, 
mobility, sexual conduct, personal appearance, labor standards, commercial trade, 
etc.78 While there are a few reports that some armed groups may have posted 
pamphlets to publicize what their rules were, mostly this was done through public 
statements by FARC commanders and word of mouth.79 Nonetheless, 90% of 
civilians interviewed by Arjona living under the control of an armed group stated 
that they always knew how to behave and what rules to observe; they knew what to 
expect from the members of the guerrilla.80 What’s more, the population often 
turned to the rebels when they encountered problems. Indeed, “in about two-thirds 
of the cases, civilians turned to combatants to solve problems related to public 
order.”81 The control over the population by the FARC also translated into tax 
collection. Even though some guerrillas in Latin America did not tax the population 
in order to avoid having to put a financial burden on the population, the FARC, 
since the 1980s, did selectively collect taxes from coca traders, cattle owners, and 
merchants.82 In the 1980s, this practice not only allowed the FARC to grow 
significantly because of its greater financial capacity, but it also imposed some order 
on the illegal economy that greatly contributed to violence and insecurity in 
Colombia.83 
In closing on FARC governance, two reactive aspects bear mentioning: on the 
one hand, the operationalization of rebel governance often triggered a backlash by 
 
75. Nicolás Espinosa Menéndez, La Justicia Guerrillera en Colombia. Elementos de Análisis para 
los Retos de la Transición Política en una Zona de Control Insurgente (el Caso del Piedemonte Amazónico), 
in ESTUDIOS LATINOAMERICANOS 87, 91 (2016) (“[U]n modelo de organización social agenciado por 
el Estado, exigido por las instituciones oficiales para cualquier tipo de trabajo entre Estado y 
comunidad, y paradójicamente, promovido por la guerrilla en las zonas rurales.”). 
76. PEÑA, supra note 41, at 99. 
77. Wickham-Crowley, supra note 58, at 48. 
78. PEÑA, supra note 41, at 146; Arjona, supra note 12, at 1373. 
79. Arjona, supra note 12, at 1373. 
80. Id. at 1371. 
81. Id. at 1372. 
82. Wickham-Crowley, supra note 58, at 58. 
83. PEÑA, supra note 41, at 280 (“[E]n esos lugares, por lo general de reciente colonización, la 
guerrilla aparecía como la única fuerza armada capaz de imponer un orden en el marco de economía 
ilegal y en donde tendían a operar diversos factores de violencia e inseguridad.”). 
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the Colombian government against the population, in the hope that people could 
be intimidated into withdrawing any degree of support for or acceptance of rebel 
rule.84 It is not clear that this succeeded in mitigating support for armed opposition 
groups, as sometimes the population would respond to terror tactics by the 
government or paramilitaries by seeking protection by insurgents.85 On the other 
hand, rebel rule, like any other type of rule, can trigger its own resistance by the 
population. There is likely to be some degree of popular resistance to any attempt 
by a non-state armed group to impose its rule. The more significant and wide-
ranging the rule by rebels, the more likely and significant the resistance by the 
population. This can take the form of spontaneous individual requests to rebel 
commanders, or collective, organized opposition to a perceived lack of respect by 
armed opposition groups. Arjona provides one example of civilian resistance to 
FARC rule in Colombia by an isolated and well-organized community: 
According to one of the community’s leaders, “at the beginning [the 
FARC] tried to rule over everything. They came to our meetings. They told 
us what we could do, where we could go, and when. We could not let this 
happen. We had been our own rulers for years.” To stop the FARC from 
taking control of their local cooperative, the community decided to talk to 
the commander: “We told [him] very clearly that we did not want 
militiamen in the area. That it was not needed. “If what you need is some 
information, we will give it to you. But we do not need orientation or 
guidelines. We don’t need any of that. We know very well what we need to 
do.” And at the end, the commander agreed. After a long discussion that 
included threats and insults, the guerrillas agreed to respect the cooperative 
and avoid intervening in its affairs.86 
There are even examples of indigenous communities resisting direct physical 
violence or death threats by the FARC and succeeding in effectively resisting its 
rule.87 This illustrates the limits of insurgent governance grounded in violence alone. 
Rebel governance, indeed all forms of governance, must be grounded in some 
degree of symbiotic relation between those wielding power and those subject to it. 
One facet of governance in which this interactive dimension is especially apparent 
is in the administration of justice. 
B. FARC Justice 
Like many other non-state armed groups, the FARC started as a small group 
without any fixed territorial basis, to later grow into a much more imposing 
movement with a heavier footprint in some parts of Colombia. As discussed in the 
 
84. Wickham-Crowley, supra note 58, at 56–57. 
85. See Alfredo Molano, La Justicia Guerrillera, in CALEIDOSCOPIO DE LAS JUSTICIAS EN 
COLOMBIA 331, 338 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Mauricio García eds., 2001). 
86. Arjona, supra note 62, at 198. 
87. Id. at 196–97. 
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previous section, rebel governance is evolving and transitory, a reflection of the 
group’s military strength and relationship with the civilian population. It is useful to 
trace the evolution of FARC justice over the course of the civil war before turning 
to more specific analysis of its internal/military and external/civilian components. 
i. Evolution of FARC Justice 
Mario Aguilera Peña, who has carried out the most extensive historical study 
of guerrilla justice in Colombia, claims that the FARC’s perspective on the law is 
reflective of its origins as a rural peasant movement.88 At the beginning, in the 
1950s, FARC rules were very basic: “do not steal, do not kill, do not rape, do not 
take someone else’s woman.”89 For Peña, despite the initial influence of the 
Communist party, the FARC’s perspective on law remained a fundamentally 
pragmatic one.90 The FARC may call it “justicia revolucionaria” (“revolutionary 
justice”) but it is not revolutionary in the sense of being innovative since it 
incorporates large segments of derecho burgués (state law), albeit with simplified 
procedures and applied in a more arbitrary manner.91 That said, FARC norms 
evolved significantly over the years, and the group became the guerrilla with the 
most developed corpus of norms in Colombia.92 Peña divides the history of guerrilla 
justice in three phases, on the basis of the objective pursued: exemplary justice (1964-
1976), retaliatory justice (1976-1985), and local empowerment justice (1985-2003).93 Each 
phase is briefly presented. 
Exemplary justice (1964-1976). One of the prominent features of this era is 
described by Peña as expedicionaria (expeditionary), which consists in an approach 
that directs attention toward small offenses and ends with death penalty or forced 
exile for the offender and was rather expeditious in its format.94 This approach 
aimed to gain sympathy from the population that was living in conflict zone, but 
also to intimidate the people and deter criminality.95 The demand for this justice 
against authors of crimes came from the peasant population itself, and the FARC 
wanted to answer the people’s security concerns with exemplary justice.96 When 
someone was sentenced to death, the sentence was published in a pamphlet and 
distributed among the population. This corresponds to a time when the FARC was 
mostly nomadic. In order to keep their influence and power on the local population, 
 
88. Mario Aguilera Peña, Las Guerrillas Marxistas y La Pena de Muerte a Combatientes: Un 
Examen de los Delitos Capitales y del “Juicio Revolucionario,” 41 ANUARIO COLOMBIANO DE HISTORIA 
SOCIAL Y DE LA CULTURA 201, 208 (2014). 
89. Id. at 209. 
90. Id. 
91. PEÑA, supra note 41, at 115. 
92. Peña, supra note 88, at 211. 
93. PEÑA, supra note 41, at 125. 
94. Id. at 126. 
95. Id. 
96. PEÑA, supra note 41. 
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they would use the autodefensa campesina (peasant self-defense organizations) or the 
autodefensa agraria (rural self-defense organizations), groups sharing common values 
with the FARC but not part of the guerrilla or the military.97 Thus, in certain zones 
under the control of autodefensa agraria, where the State was absent or 
unwelcomed, these community organizations would self-govern to a great extent, 
controlling access to the region, regulating trade, etc.98 They would also deal with 
minor offences such as stealing or being intoxicated in public, by imposing sanctions 
from small fines to expulsion. However, in cases of more serious crimes like murder 
or rape, and to deal with sapos (government informants), the FARC could intervene 
and possibly impose the death penalty.99 In the zone where its headquarters were 
located, the FARC was completely in charge. Inhabitants within 3000 square 
kilometers were completely subordinated to FARC governance, including penal 
repression of crimes such as murder, theft, rape, use of marijuana, punishable by 
forced labor, exile, or execution.100 The FARC’s administration of justice compared 
favorably in that period to that of the ELN, the second largest rebel group in 
Colombia, in which “justice” did not usually imply any form of trial and for which 
the outcome was usually execution.101 
Retaliatory justice (1976-1985). This type of dissuasive and symbolic justice was 
popularized by the M-19 rebel group, but subsequently adopted by all guerrilla 
movements in Colombia to deal with two types of people: enemies of the people 
and enemies of the revolution.102 In common with other emerging criminal law 
regime, the death penalty was its climactic focal point, although the FARC used it 
less than other insurgent groups.103 It was not a very transparent justice, with the 
indictment elaborated by the FARC regional commander and the trial and capital 
punishment sometimes pronounced unbeknownst to the individual in question.104 
The administration of justice is said to have corresponded to three distinct dynamics 
during that period: justicia defensiva (i.e., cases dealing with the security of the 
guerrilla group itself, often against informants, politicians, or state officials); justicia 
expeditionaria (i.e., cases dealing with felony or misdemeanor crimes within the 
civilian population); and justicia comunitaria (i.e., cases dealing with disputes among 
members of the community, often delegated to community organizations).105 
Local empowerment justice (1985-2003). In this period, justice was aimed at taking 
control of local and municipal power, most significantly in the zonas de retarguardias 
 
97. Id. at 243–47. 
98. Id. at 251. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 252. 
101. Molano, supra note 85, at 332. 
102. PEÑA, supra note 41, at 128, 257, 315. 
103. See generally Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION’S FATAL 
TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17 (Douglas Hay ed., 1975). 
104. PEÑA, supra note 41, at 315–19. 
105. Id. at 350. 
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nacional (national rearguard zone).106 This local justice was largely criminal, dealing 
with local corruption, appropriation of public funds, mismanagement of public 
affairs, and collaboration with paramilitary militias.107 This justice took the form of 
trials of mayors and their advisors as well as members of congress. The FARC 
carried out a true judicial offensive, acting as an instancia extraordinaria (special 
jurisdiction) to deal with private law disputes, family matters, and criminal 
offences. Insurgent justice was also found in the zonas de disputas (contested areas), 
but in a very sporadic manner, mostly aiming to protect the frentes guerilleros (guerrilla 
fronts).108 There were attempts to exert greater centralized control on the way in 
which justice was run at the local level, especially in relation to the death penalty. 
There was a retreat from what was by then perceived as an excessive resort to capital 
punishment, by substituting it for forced labor or exile in many cases, and by 
requiring that any death sentence be confirmed by FARC headquarters.109 
ii. FARC Military Justice 
Many non-state armed groups initially develop internal regulations and 
disciplinary mechanisms to ensure order within their ranks and increase the military 
effectiveness of their unit. As such, there is a pattern of insurgents having much 
more elaborate standards to deal with the administration of justice within their 
group than with respect to the civilian population. This is certainly the case for the 
FARC, whose code of conduct and internal processes are older and more elaborate 
than their rules applicable to the general population. Indeed, external administration 
of justice is by and large derivative of internal justice. For that reason, the analysis 
is best started with the internal administration of justice whereby the FARC applies 
a type of military justice to its own fighters. 
The Statute and internal regulations of the FARC provide combatants with 
guidelines on how to behave, and their rights and duties as a member of the 
movement. The document containing the Statute, the Disciplinary Regulations 
(Regulation), and the Internal Norms of Commandment was first approved in 
1966, and revised in 1978, 1982, 1993, and 2007.110 The current version, 
conveniently available online on the FARC website, appears to date from 2013.111 
The discipline regime is described as a new way of perceiving military discipline, 
 
106. Id. at 129. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 130. 
109. Id. at 129–31. 
110. Peña, supra note 88, at 211; Juan David Laverde Palma, Un Vistazo al Régimen Disciplinario 
de las Farc, EL ESPECTADOR, May 23, 2014, http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/un-vistazo-
al-regimen-disciplinario-de-farc-articulo-494178 [ https://perma.cc/4CUA-ET69]. 
111. FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA, REGLAMENTO DE RÉGIMEN 
DISCIPLINARIO DE LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA (2013), http://farc-
ep.co/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Estatutos.pdf [ https://perma.cc/8FAF-9EF4]. 
First to Printer_Provost (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:43 AM 
244 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:227 
 
 
which is not brutal and does not discriminate, and is referred to as a “proletarian-
military.”112 Section 8 of the Regulation also provides that the members of the group 
must prevent the war from being a total war that will harm the people.113 The Statute 
and Regulation are filled with revolutionary values, such as solidarity, equality, and 
complete devotion to the cause. The Regulation lists a number of prohibited acts, 
starting with a prohibition to kill fellow members of the FARC and men and women 
from the civilian population. The Regulation also prohibits of sexual violence and 
looting.114 
Chapter I of the Regulation provides for sanctions applicable to all members 
of the movement found to have committed disciplinary breaches, regardless of 
rank.115 The guerrilleros who fail to comply with the Statute or Regulation can 
permanently or definitively lose their rights to hold a position within the FARC or 
may have to perform forced labor or any other activity as a sanction that will be 
imposed through a decision of the appropriate body.116 For the most serious crimes, 
including treason, spying, desertion, killing, sexual violence, and looting, there is a 
specific mechanism to establish the sanction: the consejo revolucionario de guerra 
(revolutionary court-martial).117 The court-martial is composed of a president, a 
secretariat, five “juries of conscience,” and a prosecutor, who are all elected by the 
general assembly of guerrilleros, composed of a minimum of twenty-five fighters.118 
The defender is chosen by the accused from among those in the general assembly. 
The defender is given access to relevant documents and will be allocated a 
reasonable time to confer with the accused. The FARC unit commander that 
convened the court-martial is not allowed to take part in the proceedings, and must 
withdraw to another location.119 
Informants indicate that the hearings are not tightly structured, and that 
various participants can intervene as many times as they think useful. Meanwhile, 
the accused is normally tied to a tree during the proceedings. The defender will 
usually invoke the right to life as a fundamental natural right, the irreparable nature 
of the sanction, the involuntariness of the crime, the degree of seriousness of the 
allegations, and the youth of the accused. What is more, the Regulation provides an 
exemption from criminal responsibility where the order given could lead to a 
crime.120 The prosecutor will always invoke the specific section of the Regulation 
that has been violated, evoke the need to maintain discipline within the FARC, and 
 
112. Id. at 23. 
113. Id. at 25. 
114. Id. at 28–29. 
115. Id. at 30–32, 34. 
116. Id. at 32–33. 
117. Id. at 28–30. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 31. 
120. Id. at 33. 
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invite the jurors to decide not based on their emotions but on their conscience.121 
The verdict is rendered by a majority of jurors, who can declare the accused guilty 
or discharged. The verdict has to be approved by the Assembly. The participants in 
the Assembly can comment on the verdict and provide the reasons why they agree 
or not with it. Witness accounts suggest that it would not be rare for half of the 
Assembly members to intervene during the discussions to speak their mind. For 
example, in one account of a court-martial for a fighter accused of desertion, 
members of the Assembly did not hesitate to express their view that the fault laid 
with the unit leader who had unfairly harassed this fighter for months, making her 
life in the unit unbearable.122 If the verdict is rejected by the Assembly, the President 
has to read the judgment again which is followed by a new vote.123 It is also 
noteworthy that deserters can be judged in abstensia but otherwise the accused must 
be present and given a chance to participate. Peña argues that although the FARC 
incorporated some basic principles of criminal law in their norms, several principles 
were left aside, such as different modes of participation, mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances, and criteria to define the appropriate sanctions.124 
The process of a court-martial is established by the Regulation and is quite 
ritualistic, composed of nine stages: (1) Hymn of the FARC; (2) Record of the 
meeting and the attending members; (3) Reading of the convocation; (4) Election 
of court-martial members (i.e., prosecutor, defender, juries); (5) Read the report (the 
allegations); (6) Discussion by the assembly (the commanders are not in the room 
and the discussion starts with the Defender, followed by the Prosecution, and the 
members of the Assembly, if they want to give their opinions); (7) Jury Deliberation; 
(8) Reading and approval of the verdict; (9) Conclusions (final reading of the 
judgment).125 
There is a range of sanctions that can be imposed by the court-martial, 
including physical labor, being disarmed for a period of time, having to study the 
Regulation, etc. Capital punishment is also a potential sanction, limited to the most 
serious crimes, such as murder and treason, desertion, disclosure of secret 
information, killing of a FARC member or a civilian, and “crimes of similar 
seriousness,” which could include sexual violence and looting of civilians, 
depending on the circumstances.126 
Notwithstanding the fact that execution is a sanction restricted for the most 
serious offences, it is the most controversial and frequently raises attention in the 
media. La Semana, a Colombian newspaper, reported in 2010 that the FARC 
 
121. Peña, supra note 88, at 228. 
122. Molano, supra note 85, at 351–52. 
123. Peña, supra note 88, at 229. 
124. Id. at 212. 
125. Id. at 225–27. 
126. Id. at 216. 
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executed more of their own troops than they killed enemies in combat.127 The 
journalist described the trials organized by the FARC, and qualified those trials as 
“mock trials, fraud trials.”128 The newspaper El Espectador claimed that the FARC 
is sentencing guerrilleros to death by firing squad for ridiculous reasons, 
encompassed in the criminalization of “any activities that could go against the 
revolutionary morale of the troops.”129 “They have been shooting their own troops 
for more than 30 years,” said another newspaper, while former guerrilleros who fled 
from the FARC are quoted as saying that a minor offence or fault could be punished 
with a death sentence.130 While there are reliable reports of insurgent groups in 
Colombia carrying out executions of their own members, such media reports often 
appear to owe more to anti-rebel propaganda than accurate depiction of the regular 
operation of military justice in groups like the FARC. There are indeed some 
detailed accounts by FARC informants that convey the hesitations that 
commanders would often feel before meting out such a drastic punishment upon 
one of their own. In one case, a commander recalls how a fighter, well-liked in his 
unit was accused by a civilian woman of sexual assault, with no other witness. 
Confronted with a classic “he said/she said” situation and suspecting that this might 
have been a romantic encounter gone wrong, he nevertheless felt pressured by the 
community to convene a court-martial to prosecute the fighter.131 The case was put 
to an assembly of villagers, with FARC fighters not entitled to vote, and a majority 
favored execution. The verdict was challenged, a new assembly convened, and again 
the death penalty was approved.132 In the end, the fighter confessed and was duly 
executed. The commander remarked, “el pueblo habla, el pueblo manda” (roughly 
equivalent to “vox populi, vox dei”), such that a guerrilla group that strays from the 
people cannot survive.133 
According to the Regulation, there is a possibility to appeal a verdict if the 
sanction can be considered unfair.134 If the appeal is perceived to be inspired by 
malicious intention, a more severe sanction can be granted. Both the accused and 
the commander and secretariat can appeal the sanction. 
 
127. Los Fusilados de las FARC, SEMANA, Feb. 13, 2010, http://www.semana.com/nacion/
Article/los-fusilados-farc/113072-3 [ https://perma.cc/2PQB-MK35]. 
128. Id. 
129. Palma, supra note 110. 
130. Consejos de Guerra y Fusilamientos de las Farc, los Temas Pendientes que Buscan Justicia, 
PULZO, July 27, 2015, http://www.pulzo.com/nacion/consejos-de-guerra-y-fusilamientos-de-las- 
farc-los-temas-pendientes-que-buscan/381031 [ https://web.archive.org/web/20151023175608/ 
http://www.pulzo.com/nacion/consejos-de-guerra-y-fusilamientos-de-las-farc-los-temas-pendientes-
que-buscan/381031]; Gonzalo Guillen, Las FARC Fusilan a Sus Proprios Guerrilleros, EL NUEVO 
HERALD, Feb. 21, 2010, http://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america-latina/colombia-
es/article2003277.html [ https://perma.cc/2PUQ-67NK]. 
131. Molano, supra note 85, at 354–55. 
132. Id. at 357. 
133. Id. at 358. 
134. FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA, supra note 111, at 34. 
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iii. FARC Civilian Justice 
As was suggested at the beginning of the previous section, the administration 
of justice for civilian matters was, for the FARC as much as for other non-state 
armed groups in Colombia, an afterthought. Institutional thinking about norms and 
institutions occurred in relation to internal matters or, put differently, military 
justice. When the FARC came to wield some power over certain civilian 
populations, one aspect of rebel governance that organically grew was a form of 
administration of justice. One FARC informant made a parallel to the Far West, 
where any figure of authority that appeared was solicited to help in the resolution 
of disputes and in the sanction of unacceptable behavior.135 This was especially so 
in those parts of the country where the state was present in a very limited way or 
altogether absent. The FARC saw it as part of their revolutionary project to resolve 
these problems for the general population.136 The FARC was active both at the 
normative level, determining applicable law, and at the institutional level, providing 
structures to apply that law. 
In the 1990s, the FARC was controlling or maintaining a strong presence in 
40 to 50% of the 1071 municipalities in Colombia.137 Where the State was absent, 
the FARC would implement a state-like structure and apply “some primitive law.”138 
Basically, the insurgents would invoke local customs, rooted in the values and 
traditions of peasant life, which happened to accord with those embraced by the 
FARC’s own ideology.139 This was especially so if the local community was unified 
and well-organized when the FARC arrived. 140 The law applied to the civilians was 
thus rarely explicitly written, which did not pose a problem when local norms were 
applied.141 
The FARC issued a manual of obedience with forty-six points.142 This manual 
is directed toward the inhabitants of FARC-controlled territories and it is said to be 
a guide for the good functioning of the community, regulating, inter alia, church 
activities and economic life. Another document commanding the population to 
 
135. Interview with FARC Commander ( July 2016). 
136. Id. 
137. Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Feb. 26, 
1999, Doc. 9 rev. 1, https://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Colom99en/table%20of%20contents.htm 
[ https://perma.cc/XP32-BDJ9]. 
138. Carrillo-Suarez, supra note 35, at 94. 
139. Molano, supra note 85, at 334. 
140. Arjona, supra note 62. 
141. Menéndez, supra note 75, at 100 (“Las FARC, como he mencionado antes, no tienen una 
normatividad establecida para trabajar la justicia local. Pero tomando en cuenta que las comunidades 
tienen definido el criterio de lo justo como factor que debe primar para solucionar un conflicto, las 
FARC trabajan sobre estos criterios.”). 
142. Javier Alexander Macías, Así se Vive Bajo la Ley de las Farc en el Bajo Putumayo,  
EL COLOMBIANO, Oct. 18, 2013, http://www.elcolombiano.com/historico/asi_se_vive_bajo_la_ 
ley_de_las_farc_en_el_bajo_putumayo-AYEC_265713 [ https://perma.cc/P3M2-4MND]. 
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obey to the FARC, the “normas de convivencia ciudadana” (“norms of 
coexistence”), was displayed in public places.143 In both cases, these were norms 
designed specifically for the civilian population rather than for FARC members. 
That being said, Peña informed us that norms used by the guerrilla to resolve 
interpersonal conflict are, at 95%, the official law of the state.144 However, with 
regard to procedural rules and criminal sentencing, there were marked differences 
between FARC practices and official law.145 The guerrilla members are the ones 
who interpret the norms, decide what is fair and what is not, and determine whether 
there is a complementary conflict resolution mechanism from peasant 
organizations. 
At an institutional level, there is some uncertainty as to the approach taken by 
the FARC. Molano claims that the FARC created a judicial apparatus with 
“tribunales elementales y las asambleas” (“basic courts and assemblies”), first 
established to judge combatants but later used for civilians.146 Espinosa disputes 
this assessment, and rather posits that the FARC did not establish a judicial 
apparatus, but used an array of different mechanisms to resolve conflicts within the 
communities.147 They agree that when a decision was taken by an elder from the 
community, called conciliador (mediator), the FARC would respect the decision. 
For private law matters, the approach seemed to have been mostly 
minimalistic but nevertheless quite effective. The FARC tried to make an 
appearance in villages on market days, not only to stock up on essentials for its own 
needs, but also to interact with the population for political and other matters.148 The 
commander would set up a table in a public place, typically the school, and people 
would line up to present their problems.149 This could cover the entire gamut of 
private law disputes, from neighbors fighting over property lines to abandoned 
wives seeking support from their ex-husbands, debt collection to injuries caused by 
 
143. Molano, supra note 85, at 333. 
144. PEÑA, supra note 41, at 107. 
145. Id. at 107 (“[L]as normas jurídicas que usan los insurgentes para resolver los conflictos 
interindividuales son en un 95% normas estatales, en lo que respecta a disposiciones o figuras 
sustantivas, mas no así en procedimientos y penas, en las que habría una involución respecto al derecho 
estatal. La reglas sustantivas usadas pueden catalogarse como de domino público pues aparecer inscritas 
en los usos y costumbres campesinas, hacen parte del sentido común y del derecho consuetudinario, se 
inscriben en las prácticas de las relaciones entre individuos o comunidades con las instituciones y los 
representantes del Estado . . . .”). 
146. Molano, supra note 85, at 334. 
147. Menéndez, supra note 75, at 101 (“Esto implica que las FARC-EP no manejan una sola 
forma y una sola estrategia para solucionar problemas sino que hacen uso de varios mecanismos: se 
valen de los Comités, se apoyan en las comunidades, mantienen comandantes de área, envían 
comisiones con poderes, en ocasiones levantan actas, etcétera.”). 
148. Interview with FARC Commander (July 2016). 
149. Menéndez, supra note 75, at 98 (“Por lo general las reuniones se hacen en una escuela 
donde se cita a la comunidad de una vereda, de varias veredas o incluso a todas las veredas de la 
subregión.”). 
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animals. Often, both sides to the disputes came, or the commander would send 
word for the missing side to come immediately. The commander would listen to 
both sides and possibly hear from other witnesses as well. If some aspects remained 
unclear, the commander could ask around or go see the piece of land or damaged 
good.150 In some types of cases, for example a decision as to who had title to a piece 
of land, the commander would provide a written, signed decision to be kept by the 
parties should enforcement measures be needed. In some cases, the decision was 
recorded in the official registry of decisions maintained by JAC, the local 
authority.151 The intimation in any case was that it would not be advisable to ignore 
or challenge a decision handed out by the FARC. 
For disputes around illegal business, which could hardly be brought before the 
state courts, the civilians would turn to the guerrilla.152 This was a very significant 
aspect of local justice in regions where the drug trade accounted for an enormous 
proportion of economic activities. In one case, a prostitute complained that a man 
had beaten her, broken her teeth, and that as a result she could not resume her 
trade.153 The commander assessed her lost income and the cost of dental work, and 
ordered the man to pay the specified amount, overlooking the fact that the decision 
took account of illicit activities.154 According to the population from La Macarena 
department, the State judicial institution and the judges in any case were not to be 
trusted. They would say that, in contrast with the judges, at least the guerrilla was 
not corrupt.155 Before the FARC demobilization in this region, the guerrilla opened 
a complaint office to handle all disputes in the area, headed by an old guerrilla leader 
who provided justice, settled disputes, and generally stood as the visible face of the 
guerrilla’s law and order.156 This office only lasted one year, and the duty of 
communitarian conflict resolution went back to the Comité de Conciliación (mediation 
 
150. Id. at 99 (“Cuando la guerrilla interviene directamente en el arreglo de un problema, y si las 
condiciones de la zona se prestan (no hay presencia militar), el o la Comandante de área cita a las partes 
interesadas, pregunta por testigos que puedan confirmar versiones e inspecciona –si es necesario– los 
sitios en disputa o donde se lleva a cabo el litigio (verificar el trazado de un camino, ubicar los linderos, 
mirar daños causados por ganado, fuego, etcétera). En problemas complicados, comisiona milicianos  
o colaboradores para que le averigüen datos, lo acompañen en las inspecciones o las hagan ellos  
mismos. En problemas sencillos (por ejemplo, de convivencia entre vecinos), con sólo leer un acta el o 
la comandante toma la decisión. Se ha sabido de casos en donde los o las comandantes reciben a la 
gente únicamente con un acta firmada por el Comité de Conciliación.”). 
151. Id. at 100. 
152. Id. at 95 (“[C]uando habitantes del casco urbano tienen conflictos en situaciones ilegales –
como puede ser una transacción fallida con pasta base de coca, concerniente a la venta ilegal de 
combustibles o al comercio de maderas protegidas– buscan en la zona rural a la guerrilla para tramitar 
allí, y con ellos, sus conflictos.”). 
153. Molano, supra note 85, at 344. 
154. Id. 
155. Menéndez, supra note 75, at 95. 
156. Id. 
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committee), which is a branch of the JAC.157 The strategy behind this was to give 
back the resolution of conflict to their stakeholder, in order for the FARC to 
straighten its authority.158 However, when the local institutions are weak, the FARC 
takes charge of communitarian conflict resolution.159 
For criminal matters, the FARC would hold popular trials in rural areas for 
civilians who were accused of misdemeanors or felony. The range of misdeeds 
would go from “rape, spouse abuse, theft, or failing to pay a ‘war tax.’”160 The 
popular trial, according to civilians from the region of Guaviare interviewed by 
Human Rights Watch, works as follows: the trial is announced by the FARC, then, 
the civilian population converges to the community meeting, and the FARC hears 
what people have to say.161 The civilians testify and then the FARC decides and 
executes the decision. According to another civilian, the FARC can decide on the 
guilt of someone without consulting anyone, and they can take drastic decisions. In 
1997, Human Rights Watch reported that approximately thirty people were killed 
for being suspected of having links with right-wing paramilitary groups.162 The 
Human Rights Watch report also alleged that the FARC, while conducting those 
popular trials, rarely informed the accused of the charges that were held against 
them and did not allow them to present a suitable defense.163 For Human Rights 
Watch, fundamental rights such as the presumption of innocence were not being 
respected.164 However, Sivakumaran reminds us that the “criticisms of courts for 
failing to guarantee the right to appeal, for example, are misleading given that no 
such obligation is required of armed groups,” referring to the criticism addressed by 
Human Rights Watch on the FARC popular trials.165 
The rather strident critique of FARC justice offered by Human Rights Watch 
seems certainly justified if its description of insurgent administration of justice is 
accurate. Indeed, what they describe are extrajudicial executions, pure and simple. 
Significant ethnographic work carried out since then suggests that the picture 
painted by the human rights organization may have validly represented some events, 
 
157. Id. at 97 (“La decisión de traspasar a las Juntas la responsabilidad de la resolución de 
conflictos comunitarios significó una nueva etapa para el proyecto insurgente de control territorial, en 
donde el poder local de carácter comunitario ha sido una prioridad, y su movilización, en función de 
reivindicaciones regionales ante el Estado, parte fundamental de la plataforma insurreccional.”). 
158. Id. at 101 (“El papel de las comunidades en la resolución de conflictos fue observado por 
Alfredo Molano como una estrategia de la guerrilla para fortalecer su autoridad, pues ‘(. . .) la guerrilla 
tuvo que crear un sistema jurídico y organizar la justicia. El comandante ya no podía seguir juzgando 
como durante mucho tiempo lo hizo, por lo que comenzó a crear y fortalecer aparatos de justicia como 
los tribunales elementales y las asambleas’.”). 
159. Id. at 97. 
160. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 27, at 142. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 142–43. 
165. Sivakumaran, supra note 26, at 508. 
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in particular the treatment of those thought to be government spies or 
paramilitaries, but that there are nevertheless many other events in which the FARC 
did adopt practices that come closer to what could be called administering justice.166 
There are many narratives of proceedings dealing with crimes committed by 
civilians which quite closely follow the rules for court-martials of FARC fighters.167 
Not rarely, the FARC in fact plays a calming role, when mob lynching appears as 
the most likely alternative to FARC justice. Sometimes, the trial looks more like a 
restorative justice model. For example, in a case where some men were accused of 
not contributing to the community and harassing women, the FARC commander 
asked if the accused acknowledged the harm they had caused and estimated an 
amount of money that corresponded in his view to the injury, money that would go 
to the community.168 If the community did not agree, they could suggest another 
amount or another sentence. 
The sanctions applied to civilians by FARC justice are, more often than not, 
financial penalties.169 If there was a specific victim, that person would be entitled 
to receive compensation for the harm done, including moral damages. There was 
often a community fine as well, money that would be paid into a community fund 
used to cover expenses benefitting the community as a whole, such as building a 
school or repairing a road or dam. Finally, the FARC would also collect the 
equivalent of court fees for its troubles. Repeat offenders or authors of more serious 
crimes could be ordered to leave the region and never come back. Exile was 
considered a harsh penalty for local offenders, because in times of war people are 
distrustful of strangers. To send a local person away was to put him or her at risk 
of being taken for a spy, a criminal, or any other type of undesirable, with 
unpredictable consequences. Finally, when the crime was of extreme gravity, such 
as murder, the FARC felt pressured to impose the death penalty. To fail to do so 
would be taken as a sign of weakness, a failure to fulfil the rebel’s role in the 
community’s governance, and lead to a loss of legitimacy and thus of authority.170 
It appears that the civilian population often trusted the FARC, and not only 
out of fear. However, it would not be fair to argue that the legitimacy enjoyed by 
the FARC did not sometimes come from fear of the arbitrary use of their power.171 
III. REBEL RULE OF LAW 
The picture that emerges from this more extensive ethnographic survey of 
FARC governance related to matters of justice begs the question of how it should 
 
166. See, e.g., Molano, supra note 85. 
167. Id. at 332. 
168. Id. at 345. 
169. Interview with FARC Commander (July 2016). 
170. Molano, supra note 85, at 360–61. 
171. Menéndez, supra note 75, at 10, 103. 
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be characterized. As we see with the FARC, and indeed in the operation of other 
armed opposition groups in armed conflicts across the world, rebel governance does 
not necessarily emerge as a proto-state, mimicking the structure and practices of the 
government, although there is no questioning the fact that the latter can indeed be 
a model that is followed by rebels in significant ways. This is certainly so for the 
FARC, which grew nearer to a form of governance guided by liberalism than some 
other insurgents such as, for example, Daesch in Syria and Iraq.172 With respect to 
governance touching on matters of justice, this raises the question of whether it 
should appropriately be described as a form of administration of justice. Is rebel 
justice a valid challenge to the uniqueness of the model embraced by all states, as a 
reflection of the concept of sovereignty, under the guise of the rule of law? Is there 
a legitimate concept of a rebel rule of law that can provide a benchmark and an ideal 
against which judicial practices such as the FARC’s can be measured? 
In Section A, I argue that the exclusive association of the rule of law with the 
state is conceptually both recent and unjustified, as there are non-state institutions 
and practices corresponding to the rule of law. In Section B, I discuss the 
adjustments to the rule of law to reflect the unique constraints on the administration 
of justice during war within formal law applicable during armed conflicts. From that 
recognition, and in consideration of the insights gleaned from the closer study of 
the practice of non-state armed groups like the FARC in Colombia, I suggest the 
basic components of a rebel rule of law in Section C. 
A. Fragmented Rule of Law 
The idea of the rule of law is one that seems to attract support from every 
corner, whether it be national governments or international organizations, whether 
they be democratic or authoritarian, whether they embody western traditions or 
those of other parts of the world, whether they speak for the necessity of public 
authority or the defense of individual liberty: everyone seems in favor of the rule of 
law.173 The rhetorical popularity of the rule of law can be explained in at least two 
ways. First, as evocatively put by Mark Massoud, the rule of law is “a construct of 
desire,” such that it occupies a space that can never entirely correspond to reality.174 
As such, it has something to offer to any society, no matter how accomplished it is. 
By the same token, it is ineluctable that there will be rule of law issues in a given 
place and time, because these can and will arise in every place and at all times. When 
everyone fails, to some degree, to comply with the aspirational objectives that 
correspond to the rule of law, then to stand accused of the same does not amount 
to the most damning indictment. The answer can and will always be that this is a 
 
172. PEÑA, supra note 41, at 115. 
173. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 1–5 (2004). 
174. Mark Fathi Massoud, Ideals and Practices in the Rule of Law: An Essay on Legal Politics, 
41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 489, 494 (2016). 
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work in progress. Second, the popularity of the concept of the rule of law is a 
reflection of the malleability of its content. It is a label so broad and fuzzy that it 
answers many aspirations and hides many sins. The lack of a fixed content is not an 
accident nor the failure to bring to fruition a diplomatic negotiation or theoretical 
conversation; rather, the ambiguity of the rule of law is one of the concept’s defining 
features. The range of actors invoking the rule of law madly off in all directions 
actually sustains the demand for conceptual obscurity.175 This is compounded at the 
international level by the challenges of translating the concept of rule of law, from 
état de droit to pravovoe gosudarstvo to fahzi (法规), with every language offering a label 
that orients its substance in one direction or another.176 
The fact that the rule of law is an essentially contested concept does not mean 
that it is wholly impossible to explore its content. The possible content of the rule 
of law has been the subject of numerous studies that catalogue its component parts, 
although none attracts anything like a wide consensus.177 Generally speaking, 
descriptions of the rule of law range on a spectrum from “thin” to “thick” versions, 
progressively locating more and more content within the concept. The 2004 
definition included in the UN Secretary-General report on the rule of law and 
transitional justice is often given as a starting point: 
[The rule of law] refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, 
institutions, and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and 
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international 
human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure 
adherence to the principles of the supremacy of law, equality before the 
law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.178 
This corresponds to a “thick” version of the rule of law, also endorsed by the 
EU Venice Commission and by scholars like Lord Bingham and Lon Fuller.179 As 
can be seen from the definition quoted above, there is in this view a considerable 
overlap between the rule of law and other notions like human rights, democracy, 
good governance, and constitutionalization. At this end of the spectrum, perhaps 
 
175. Peer C. Zumbansen, The Rule of Law, Legal Pluralism, and Challenges to a Western-Centric 
View: Some Very Preliminary Observations, 47 TRANSNAT’L L. INST. 2, 4 (2016). 
176. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW (2003); Robert 
McCorquodale, Defining the International Rule of Law: Defying Gravity?, 65 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 227, 
279 (2016). 
177. TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW (2010); TAMANAHA, supra note 173; THE RULE OF 
LAW AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS: CONTESTATIONS AND DEFERENCE 
(Machiko Kanetake & André Nollkaemper eds., 2016); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
178. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004). 
179. BINGHAM, supra note 177; LON LUVOIS FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1969). 
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most clearly embodied in Bingham’s writing, the debate corresponds to the extent 
to which the rule of law incorporates all “fundamental” human rights standards.180 
It stands for an affirmation that a legal regime issued from a non-democratic 
authority that fails to respect basic principles of equality under the law or judicial 
independence cannot be described as corresponding to the rule of law.181 This is 
meant as a rejection, at times in emphatic terms, of a “thin” version of the rule of 
law according to which the concept is a looser guide to the ways in which 
governmental authority must be bounded by rules that are fixed and knowable prior 
to their application. Advocates of this approach make the point that if all our 
aspirations are rolled into the concept of law, then it loses much of its usefulness 
because it will add little to the sum of its component parts. In this view, the rule of 
law speaks more to a set of values and meta-principles that must guide how 
governments behave; to paraphrase Hannah Arendt, it amounts to “speaking law to 
power.”182 Thus for Joseph Raz, this is an important virtue that we seek to develop 
in any legal regime, but only one among many, not coextensive with human rights, 
democracy, or justice.183 As a result, he concluded, it is not impossible that an 
undemocratic government that persecutes some of its citizens on the basis of 
discriminatory policies could nevertheless be compliant with the rule of law.184 At 
the same time, the concept cannot be diluted to the point at which it merely 
becomes a validation of state sovereignty. Even in its thin version, there is some 
identifiable content to the rule of law, including the need for laws to be prospective, 
clear, and stable, and that there be an independent and accessible mechanism to 
oversee the application of these laws.185 Whether defined as thicker or thinner 
version of the rule of law, it is agreed that the concept embodies aspirational values 
that remain unlikely to be fully achieved in any state. As such, the invocation of the 
rule of law in any context does not lead to all-or-nothing conclusions, but rather to 
situating the government under consideration along a spectrum of compliance with 
its tenets, however defined.186 
Up to this point, the analysis of the rule of law has taken the state as a focus. 
Even in its thin version, a central ambition of the concept is to subject the exercise 
of governmental authority to legal regulation. There is here a certain circularity in 
that we seek to control the state by way of laws emanating from the state. This 
approach also raises the question of whether the exercise of authority by entities 
 
180. BINGHAM, supra note 177, at 67. 
181. Id. at 66–67; Jeremy Waldron, Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule 
of Law?, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 315 (2011). 
182. HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 56–57, 63 (1970). 
183. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 211 (1979). 
184. Id. Arguably, one example could have been South Africa during the Apartheid regime. See 
DAVID DYZENHAUD, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: PATHOLOGIES OF LEGALITY 223–
57 (2d ed. 2010). 
185. RAZ, supra note 183, at 214–19. 
186. McCorquodale, supra note 176, at 291. 
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other than the state ought to be subject to the rule of law, as well as the question of 
whether the rules that regulate nongovernmental authority can only emanate from 
the state, or whether they could find their basis in non-state actors. The fact that 
rule of law scholarship—with a few, marginal exceptions—focuses on the state is a 
reflection of the attribution to the state of a monopoly on law. Law is both a product 
of and a justification for the sovereignty of the state, leading the UN Secretary-
General to remark that “[t]he rule of law is at the heart of State sovereignty.”187 
It is worthwhile to be reminded of the relative novelty of the association of 
law and the state. Until a few centuries ago, law was an aspect of life that reflected 
in a significant manner social structures other than the state.188 Going back even 
further to the Middle Ages, we see that the law was not an instrument of earthly 
power to be wielded by the prince. Quite the opposite, the law was essentially 
customary, “an unwritten and unchanging eternal norm” that evolved slowly and 
invisibly rather than by the fiat of a ruler.189 The capture of law by the state was a 
slow and progressive process, extending over many centuries and following patterns 
that differed from country to country. For very long periods, multiple legal regimes 
overlapped in any given place. Some were applied only to certain classes of society, 
the nobility with its leges feudorum, the merchants with the lex mercatoria, and city 
dwellers with municipal law; some laws followed geography, with each village and 
valley having its own custom, often expressed in the distinctive local dialect; some 
laws followed blood rather than land, on the model of the Ottoman millet system; 
other laws still attached to religious identity, with canon law acting as a transnational 
ius commune for Christians across Europe, but also Islamic law and Talmudic law in 
parallel; and the rediscovery of Roman legal texts in the twelfth and then again in 
the sixteenth century, thanks to the rise of the university, overlaid “scientific” legal 
norms that weren’t linked to any segment of the population nor to the state but that 
played an important role in private law matters, especially property law.190 In many 
cases, there were courts that corresponded to particular communities or legal 
regimes, from manorial courts and royal courts to merchant courts and church 
courts.191 There was no neat division between court and law, such that a given court 
could be called to apply norms from a range of regimes depending on the identity 
of the parties and the nature of the issue in dispute.192 
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In France, the state appears in the picture in a push to force the writing down 
of customary laws, ordered by Charles VII in 1454, to bring some order to the more 
than 300 distinct customs applied in the kingdom at the time.193 During the same 
period, Ordonnances Colbert, a small number of ordinances, were issued by the king, 
to impose rules touching on some discrete fields. This started a process of 
appropriation that combined with the intellectual dominance of the Paris custom to 
make possible the revolutionary codification of French law in the Napoleon Code 
of 1804, replacing in one fell swoop the myriad non-state customs with a single state 
law.194 In England, the state’s capture of law was more significantly institutional, 
with royal courts travelling on periodic circuits around the country to bring the 
king’s justice to the people, in a manner that was initially complementary to other 
courts but that gradually came to assume a prominence that reflected the 
centralization of law in the state.195 Similar patterns have been mapped in colonial 
contexts with the writing down of indigenous custom by colonial officials and the 
parceling of jurisdiction to various types of bodies, resulting not only in a profound 
transformation of local law but also the progressive appropriation of what had been 
decentralized popular law into institutionalized state law.196 
The purpose of this quick historical excursus is to underscore the fact that the 
exclusive association of law with the state is one that is not very old, and as such 
rooted neither in the concept of law nor in the idea of the state. As discussed in the 
first section of this paper, legal pluralism’s frontal attack of the positivist precept of 
centralism stands as a denial that the state’s capture of law was ever successful.197 
Law, it is argued, has never been a state monopoly: there are many non-state centers 
and processes that create, interpret, and apply law.198 The state may be the most 
comprehensive legally based organization of our time, but there are others as well.199 
It is said that in some parts of Africa, upwards of 90% of disputes, including land 
disputes, are resolved by way of non-state mechanisms.200 As a result, the concerns 
embodied in the concept of the rule of law understood in its fuller sense speaks to 
the manner in which law operates in all these legal centers and processes, including 
those not connected to the state. 
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Discussion of the rule of law meaningfully has ventured beyond the state with 
respect to one category of legal actors: international organizations. From about the 
year 2000, some academics argued that the nature of powers wielded by 
international organizations justified extending to them the principles of the rule of 
law.201 Anti-terrorism measures adopted by the United Nations (UN) after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001 directly affected important rights and interests of 
individuals. For instance, the Sanctions Committee, authorized by the UN Security 
Council, listed individuals on no-fly lists or to be targeted for financial 
restrictions.202 The justification, execution, and reviewability of these decisions have 
been challenged as falling short of what would be demanded of a state taking similar 
measures.203 Peacekeeping and other international missions are another instance of 
international organizations exercising state-like authority over population and 
territory, sometimes as a direct proto-governmental administrator, other times as an 
external actor whose presence on the territory of a state cannot be derived from the 
sovereign authority of that state. When such a situation occurs, the fact that a power 
usually associated with the government is in fact held by an international 
organization does not seem to be a compelling basis to deny the protection and 
requirements associated with the rule of law in relation to the exercise of such 
power. The lack of any accountability mechanism to sanction the spread of cholera 
in Haiti due to the failure of the UN to take necessary and available precautions has 
been cited as one especially glaring example of the need for rule of law principles to 
apply to international organizations.204 The internal processes of international 
organizations provide a final context in which powers are used in a manner that 
intersects with the values embodied in the rule of law. Organizations like the UN 
are employers that escape the applicability of national labor standards that normally 
prevent abuses. The UN does have internal norms and procedures, but these have 
been repeatedly challenged as falling short of recognized international standards on 
transparency, independence, and reviewability. Changes were brought that 
addressed some of these shortcoming, with explicit references to the rule of law.205 
Criddle and Fox-Decent, as part of their exploration of the justification of state 
sovereignty, suggest that if an international organization exercises public 
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authority—powers that are other-regarding, purposive, and institutional in nature—
then it stands in a fiduciary position vis-à-vis humanity and as such ought to be 
governed by standards that frame state powers.206 While they turn to human rights 
norms as a result, the argument can also be taken to point in the direction of the 
rule of law. 
Consideration of the applicability of the rule of law to international 
organizations is interesting not only in that it dislodged the concept from its original 
state-centered ambit, but also because it triggered a reflection on the substance of 
the rule of law at the international level.207 I mentioned at the start of this section 
that the lack of agreement on the content of the rule of law paradoxically stands as 
one of its defining features. Within that observable diversity of views, however, 
when the international rule of law is discussed, it seems that there is a general 
consensus that the rule of law applicable to state actions and the rule of law 
applicable to international organizations cannot be the same. Because of 
fundamental differences in the foundation, structure, and purpose of states and 
international organizations, the components of the national rule of law (howsoever 
defined) cannot be transferred lock, stock and barrel to an international rule of 
law.208 José Alvarez notes in this respect that courts may well be called to play 
different roles at the domestic and international levels. In public international law, 
there are many situations in which there is no possibly of judicial review of the 
legality of an act, both for jurisdictional reasons (courts have limited rather than 
general jurisdiction, of an optional rather than compulsory nature) and for 
functional reasons (the UN Security Council plays a role in responding to threat to 
international peace that doesn’t square easily with judicial review).209 
As a guiding principle, the substance of the rule of law must reflect the specific 
and evolving context of the exercise of public authority to which it is applied, with 
the shift from states to international organizations as a fundamental change in 
context that calls for significant adjustments to facets of the rule of law that some 
would consider central. In this light, enriched by a legal pluralist understanding of 
law, the rule of law emerges as a living organism rather than a fixed list of attributes 
or an idealized image of justice.210 It follows that the rule of law applied to public 
authority exercised by rebels would be substantially distinct from that applied to 
either the state or international organizations. 
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B. Rule of Law in Armed Conflict 
War disrupts many of the values and practices that are normally considered 
fundamental, and as such is a type of contextual transformation that can be expected 
to translate into a significantly distinct rule of law. The disruptive impact of armed 
conflict on the rule of law is reflected in both legal regimes that regulate war, 
international human rights, and humanitarian law, in a fashion that speaks directly 
to an imagined rebel rule of law. 
International human rights law does not stop producing legal effects during 
periods of armed conflicts, although the outbreak of war does have a normative 
impact on the protection of human rights. The precise nature of the relationship 
between human rights and international humanitarian law has been the subject of 
enormous academic and judicial attention over the last several decades. Positions 
range from the International Court of Justice’s approach whereby human rights law 
is lex generalis to international humanitarian law’s lex specialis, to the European Court 
of Human Rights jurisprudence in which humanitarian law could inspire the 
interpretation of human rights but not displace them.211 There is no longer any 
debate, if there ever was a serious one, on the fact that human rights remain legally 
applicable. The clear intent of states to this effect can be seen in the inclusion of a 
derogation clause that authorizes states to suspend rights and freedoms in situations 
of emergency that threaten “the life of the nation” in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the 
American Convention on Human Rights.212 While both the European and 
American regional instruments mention “war” specifically, but the Covenant does 
not, it is a given that armed conflicts are the prototypical emergency that can 
threaten the life of the nation. The treaty provisions that explicitly provide for the 
possibility of derogation during a state of emergency include a list of rights that are 
deemed “non-derogable.”213 Tellingly, the list of non-derogable rights in the 
Covenant, the European Convention and the American Convention do not include 
due process guarantees that arguably constitute an important element of the rule of 
law.214 As such, the state of emergency is a direct challenge to the foundational role 
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of the rule of law.215 Even if the threat to the survival of the political community is 
averred, however, international human rights law does not provide for the 
jettisoning of the rule of law. The possibility of derogation is constrained: limitations 
on rights must be temporary, officially proclaimed, and strictly limited to the 
exigencies of the situation.216 The ensuing requirements of necessity and 
proportionality reinforce the conclusion offered in the previous section regarding 
the ever-changing requirements of the rule of law, always reflecting the specifics of 
the circumstances of their application. In war, as the prototypical state of emergency 
recognized in international human rights treaties, the rule of law must be adapted 
to reflect the often extraordinary circumstances in which the administration of 
justice takes place. Human rights treaty provisions on derogation indeed point the 
way as to how to carry out this necessary adjustment, in specifying that any measure 
taken to limit rights and freedoms during a state of emergency must comply with 
the state’s “other obligations under international law.”217 In this respect, 
international human rights law is structurally connected to international 
humanitarian law, as well as to other fields of international law. 
The possibility for states to derogate from a number of fundamental human 
rights, including minimally some rights that will often be taken to form part of the 
substance of the rule of law, supports the claim that this concept will be transformed 
significantly by its application to situations of armed conflict. This brief foray into 
international human rights law has, to this point, focused on the state’s right to 
suspend fundamental rights and freedoms during an emergency. In the context of 
the exploration of the relevance of the concept of the rule of law to the rebel 
administration of justice, this begs the question of whether only a state may derogate 
during a state of emergency, or whether a non-state armed group may do so as well. 
This is of course a provocative suggestion, one that does not seem to have been 
considered in legal doctrine so far. An initial answer might be that the specific 
provisions of the treaties cited in the previous paragraph refer only to a state 
declaring a situation of emergency, and therefore that no other entity is competent 
to do the same. It is well and true that, for example, Article 4 of the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights only envisages that states can derogate, but it is equally 
true that Article 2 of the same treaty spells out substantive human rights obligations 
of states, and no one else.218 There is thus an issue of “having your cake and eating 
it too” with the overly facile response resting on the wording of the derogation 
provisions in the treaties. Beyond the range of technical explanations that have been 
offered to justify the applicability of human rights standards to armed opposition 
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groups,219 the conundrum remains that if rebels exercise public authority in a 
manner that warrants the application of human rights, the same can be invoked to 
articulate a justification for a right to derogate that will mirror that proclaimed in 
favor of states. For instance, in a recent book Criddle and Fox-Decent offer a 
fiduciary foundation for both the imposition of human rights obligations on 
governments and for the possibility of suspension during a state of emergency.220 
The final chapter of their book interrogates the applicability of a fiduciary 
construction of sovereignty to international organizations, leading them to conclude 
that inasmuch as they exercise public authority, organizations ought to be bound by 
human rights norms.221 They do not take the extra step of asking what are the 
implications of this conclusion in situations of emergency, but the justification 
offered earlier in the book for derogation seems equally transposable to 
international organizations.222 In a parallel fashion, the public authority approach 
can be applied to governance by non-state armed groups to justify both the 
applicability of human rights—or the rule of law—and the possibility of derogation. 
Similar questions arise with respect to another human rights doctrine that has 
had a significant impact on the application of human rights in general, and 
derogations during a state of emergency in particular: the margin of appreciation. 
Initially developed by the European Court of Human Rights, the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation provides that a state shall be granted a significant degree of 
deference in the interpretation and application of human rights.223 In other words, 
when a human rights body examines whether a measure taken by a government is 
consistent with its obligations, the assessment ought not to be in the nature of a de 
novo evaluation but closer to vetting the reasonableness of the position taken by the 
state. This form of judicial restraint has been justified on the basis of the greater 
proximity of the national government to the situation at hand, as compared to a 
supra-national court like the European Court of Human Rights, as well as the open-
textured nature of human rights norms that can accommodate a diversity of 
legitimate interpretations.224 The same provocative question arises here again: if an 
armed opposition group administers justice and, as such, is said to be bound by 
international human rights law and subject to the rule of law, should the group be 
granted any margin of appreciation in the application of human rights? 
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Unlike derogations in a state of emergency, the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation does not rest on any textual foundation in the treaties; as such, the easy 
rebuttal identified for derogation, on the basis of the explicit reference to the state 
in treaty provisions allowing derogations, does not obtain for the margin of 
appreciation. One might imagine an objection based on the foundation of the public 
authority wielded by non-state armed groups as opposed to governments. Two 
reasons can be mentioned to question the persuasiveness of this objection. First, it 
suggests that governments are granted a margin of appreciation because they have 
legitimacy, normally linked to their democratic representativeness. This would imply 
that governments that are in fact not democratic, or more broadly not 
representative, should be given a smaller margin, or none at all. Andrew Legg, in his 
comprehensive study of the doctrine, makes a valiant effort to defend such a reading 
of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.225 He notes that in 
some of the cases in which the Court relies on the doctrine like Dudgeon v. UK, there 
are mentions of the government acting carefully and in good faith.226 Critically, 
however, he cannot unearth any passage in which the European Court would have 
noted the unrepresentative nature of a national government as justification for a 
narrower margin. The second objection to a foundational critique of recognizing a 
margin of appreciation to an armed opposition group speaks to the necessarily 
unrepresentative nature of such groups. As discussed in an earlier section of the 
paper, and as the conflict in Colombia illustrates, no system of governance can be 
grounded in violence alone.227 It would be extremely difficult for a rebel group to 
survive, much less exercise real governance of any kind, without some degree of 
support from the population. In Colombia, the FARC’s behavior at times attracted 
support and at other times provoked resistance from the population, and the group 
was not necessarily less representative than the government at all times. With 
respect to the administration of justice, as shown, there is no evidence to point out 
that rebel justice was thought inherently inferior to official justice, and indeed in 
some ways it was felt to be closer to the ideals of the rule of law. Just like there are 
decent states and wicked states, there are decent rebels and wicked rebels. It is not 
obvious that such distinctions provide a solid conceptual basis to dismiss the 
possible extension of a margin of appreciation to rebel groups. 
Moving from human rights to international humanitarian law, we see that the 
concept of the rule of law is transformed by the occurrence of an armed conflict in 
that its connection to state sovereignty is ruptured. This is most transparent in the 
regulation of occupation, when a power other than the territorial state comes to 
exercise authority over a conquered territory. The law of occupation, as noted by 
Eyal Benvenisti, is the mirror image of the concept of state sovereignty, and as such 
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comes to indirectly define sovereignty in international law.228 Occupation does not 
signal a transfer of sovereignty, a reflection of the now entrenched norm that 
sovereign title to territory cannot be validly acquired through the use of force. At 
the same time, it is acknowledged that an occupier can validly exercise some public 
authority over the territory and population under its control. One aspect of public 
authority explicitly recognized to an occupying force is the maintenance of public 
order and civil life,229 overlapping to a significant extent with the idea of the rule of 
law. For a very long time, the idea of a trustee has been used to describe the nature 
of the powers recognized to the occupier.230 This is of course a particular type of 
trust, in that it fails to incorporate any sense of intentional delegation from the 
territorial government in favor of the occupier, much less any sense of confidence 
from the former in the latter. Instead, the fiduciary dimension of occupation reflects 
the mere fact of occupation and the corresponding inability of the territorial state 
to exercise its normal authority in that territory. This is clearly conveyed in Article 
42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, the first codification of the law of occupation, 
which refers in the French authentic version to a territory “placé de fait sous l’autorité 
de l’armée ennemie” to the extent that this authority “est établie et en mesure de 
s’exercer”.231 In this respect, occupation law can be taken as a instance of public 
international law grounded in the principle of effectivité, that is seeking to capture 
and regulate in law a reality as it is perceived on the ground rather than articulating 
norms rooted in the idea of legitimacy.232 Indeed, the legal regulation of occupation 
is a regime under jus in bello that stands wholly insulated from the legality or 
legitimacy of the presence of the occupier in the given territory, an aspect that would 
reflect jus ad bellum.233 In this respect, for example, Iraq as an occupier further to its 
 
228. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 1–2 (2012). 
229. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 43,  
Oct. 18, 1907. 
230. Adam Roberts, What Is a Military Occupation?, 55 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 249, 294–95 (1985). 
231. There is no official English version of this treaty, but this provision can be translated as: 
“Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.” 
232. The principle of effectivité has been the subject of significant scrutiny in international legal 
writing in French, and to a lesser degree in German and Spanish, but very little in English. W. H 
BALEKJIAN, DIE EFFEKTIVITÄT UND DIE STELLUNG NICHTANERKANNTER STAATEN IM 
VÖLKERRECHT 11–18 (1970); FLORIAN COUVEINHES-MATSUMOTO, L’EFFECTIVITÉ EN DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 38 (2014); JEAN TOUSCOZ, LE PRINCIPE D’EFFECTIVITÉ DANS L’ORDRE 
INTERNATIONAL (1964); CHARLES DE VISSCHER, LES EFFECTIVITÉS DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC (1967); Adolfo Miaja de la Muela, Nuevas Realidades Y Teorías Sobre la Efectividad en Derecho 
Internacional, 3 ANUARIO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 3 (1976). I note that some authors in English 
refer to it as a principle of “effectiveness,” although d’Aspremont draws a distinction between 
“effectiveness” and “effectivité.” See Jean d’Aspremont, “Effectivity” in International Law: Self-
Empowerment Against Epistemological Claustrophobia, 108 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 165, 165 (2014); 
Salvatore Zappalà, Can Legality Trump Effectiveness in Today’s International Law?, in REALIZING 
UTOPIA 105, 106–07 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2012). 
233. HENRI MEYROWITZ, LE PRINCIPE DE L’ÉGALITÉ DES BELLIGÉRANTS DEVANT LE 
DROIT DE LA GUERRE (1970). 
First to Printer_Provost (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:43 AM 
264 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:227 
 
 
manifestly illegal invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was in principle in the same legal 
situation as was the United Kingdom after it took control of part of Iraq in 2003. 
Two ideas interesting for our discussion of rebel governance emerge from this 
analysis. First, international law explicitly reflects the suggestion that the power to 
govern, bringing with it the principle of the rule of law, can be dissociated from 
sovereignty, at least in situations of armed conflict. Second, the recognition of 
public authority exercised by the occupying force is not tied to the legitimacy of its 
presence or power. 
This sketch of the construction of governance and the rule of law in wartime 
can be sharpened with three observations. To begin with, the nature and extent of 
the powers of the occupier have been the subject of intense debate regarding the 
extent to which an invading state is required to leave in place and enforce the laws 
of the occupied government. An older construction of the framing idea of the 
occupier as trustee identified the territorial government as the beneficiary of that 
trust. In this perspective, the occupier is a placeholder for the territorial government, 
and as such is granted the most limited power to alter existing laws and public 
institutions. Over the course of the last century, a competing vision of occupation 
has come to emerge, whereby the primary beneficiary of the fiduciary powers held 
by the occupier is the population of the occupied territory. Under the very 
significant influence of international human rights law, this “transformative 
occupation” allows or even requires the occupier to bring the legal order of the 
occupied territory in line with the requirements of the rule of law.234 Regardless 
whether the law of occupation has fully evolved to embrace a wholly transformative 
approach, this is a movement towards a tighter embrace of the rule of law in 
situations of armed conflict, with a corresponding lesser priority given to concerns 
of state sovereignty. 
A second, related observation touches on the steady widening of the 
extraterritorial application of human rights. This is, again, a much-contested 
development, centered in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. In a series of cases over the last decade, the European Court has reversed 
an earlier approach that eschewed to a large extent the applicability of state 
obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights for acts that take 
place beyond national borders.235 The military occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan 
by a number of states party to the European Convention provided an opportunity 
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for the Court to revisit this position, leading it to conclude that an occupier is 
required to comply with its human rights obligations to a very large extent.236 The 
extension of this approach to contexts beyond the European Convention of Human 
Rights to other treaties and to customary law, as well as the particulars of when and 
to what extent these obligations are applicable, remain very contentious. That said, 
it is an evolution that both converges with a “transformative” vision of occupation 
and insists on the need for enjoyment of rights and freedoms regardless of who is 
in power in a given time and place. It converges as well with a reading of 
international human rights law that concludes, as noted earlier, that when non-state 
actors are acting in a position of public authority they should be bound to comply 
with human rights obligations.237 
The third and final observation on the construction of the rule of law in times 
of war centers on the scope of the concept of occupation. Although the very first 
codification of the law of occupation came about in the Lieber Code and concerned 
the civil war in the United States, the various humanitarian law treaties that regulate 
occupation only apply it explicitly to situations of international armed conflict in 
which a state occupies the territory of another state.238 In the RUF Case before the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, the defense tried to plead that the non-state armed 
group was an occupying force and as such could force civilians to carry out work 
and confiscate property.239 The Court rejected this plea by applying a classical 
understanding of the concept of occupation, inapplicable to a situation of non-
international armed conflict like the war in Sierra Leone.240 
The concept of occupation has evolved over the years and now seems less 
fully bound to this traditional picture of belligerent occupation. The clearest 
divergence is found in Article 1(4) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I which provides 
that rules applicable to international armed conflicts shall apply to situations of 
“alien occupation,” an expression broader than belligerent occupation that was 
widely taken as a coded reference to the Israeli-Palestinian situation.241 More 
generally, the same provision of Protocol I declares that wars of national liberation 
in which a people is fighting in furtherance of its right to self-determination are to 
be deemed international armed conflict. The implication is that the national 
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(2009); Roberts, supra note 230, at 296–97. 
239. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T Judgment, ¶¶ 982–984 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber, Mar. 2, 2009). 
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liberation movement is to be treated in every respect as if it were a state, which 
would suggest that this party to the conflict can also become an occupying force 
under international humanitarian law. There is a conceptual hurdle in applying this 
suggestion, in that the national liberation movement does not have a national 
territory beyond which it becomes an occupier. This is illustrated by the sole 
declaration to date that seems to have triggered the application of Article 1(4) of 
Protocol I, issued in 2015 by the Polisario Front in Western Sahara.242 While there 
is a physical boundary of sort (a wall of sand in the desert) that marks the spheres 
of power of Morocco and Polisario, it is hardly a marker of divided sovereignty. 
The solution, in accordance with the normative framework of international 
humanitarian law, is to examine the nature of the relationship between the 
population and the military force: if it is broadly marked by enmity, if the allegiances 
of the occupier and the occupied population link to opposing sides of the conflict, 
then the former should be subject to occupation law. This is indeed consistent with 
the approach developed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia in cases in which the accused objected that they could not be convicted 
of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions because the victims were not 
“protected persons,” defined as nationals of an enemy state.243 The Tribunal in 
Celebici and Tadic concluded that the substance of differing allegiances rather than 
formal links of nationality ought to guide the application of the Geneva 
Conventions.244 There have been many suggestions that this reasoning should in 
fact apply in all non-international armed conflicts, so that a non-state armed group 
that finds itself exercising authority over a population with which it does not share 
allegiances should be bound by the law of occupation.245 This seems congruent with 
the expansion of human rights obligations to non-state actors and to the concept 
of national liberation armed conflict, as discussed earlier. Sivakumaran suggests that 
perhaps not every aspect of the law of occupation can be transposed to non-
international armed conflicts, but that a piecemeal approach could identify which 
aspects can justifiably be found applicable by insurgents in a civil war.246 One key 
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AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 186–689 (2001). 
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example he gives is the maintenance of law and order which, if not taken over by 
the rebels, would simply fail to be enforced at all.247 
These elements combine to suggest that the rule of law in situations of armed 
conflict takes on a distinct color. Substantively, as suggested by the possibility of 
derogation, its content is likely to have to be adapted to exigencies of war in order 
to provide realistic guidance that reconciles elements of the rule of law with military 
necessity. Subjectively, international legal standards attest to the lack of a necessary 
connection between the rule of law and state sovereignty, allowing for the 
administration of justice by states other than the sovereign territorial state and 
opening a door to the maintenance of law and order by non-state actors. In this 
context, the concept of the rebel rule of law stands as a point of convergence of 
various norms and trends rather than a fanciful suggestion devoid of any foundation 
in law or in fact. 
C. Elements of a Rebel Rule of Law 
The idea of the rule of law detached from the state, applied to a non-state 
armed group, and adjusted to the realities of armed conflict, hints at a concept of 
the rebel rule of law. This in turn begs the question of the content of such a concept. 
It is indeed at this second stage that the realistic and useful character of a proposed 
rebel rule of law can meaningfully be assessed. In so doing, however, I run up 
against the broader and largely intractable debate surrounding the content of the 
rule of law generally, whether it should be “thin” or “thick,” and which specific 
elements can justifiably be included. The main thrust of the analysis in this essay 
has been to demonstrate that the concept of the rebel rule of law is viable. Part of 
the argument is indeed founded on the notion that the rule of law is a variable 
concept that must be adjusted to different actors and different contexts. Logically, 
it seems inconsistent to attempt to map out an objective understanding of the 
substantive requirements of the rule of law as applied to the rebel administration of 
justice. In general, the rule of law can be said to be thinner in situations of armed 
conflict and distinct in relation to non-state actors. As a result, the elements of a 
rebel rule of law offered here correspond to a thin version of the concept, leaving 
space for more demanding components to be argued for when the circumstances 
allow for them. Finally, the elements of a rebel rule of law are not necessarily all 
derived from the rule of law as applicable to states, so that the former would be a 
pared-down version of the latter. As we will see, the administration of justice by 
non-state armed groups brings challenges that in part are unique to them, 
corresponding to elements of a rebel rule of law that are without equivalent for 
states. Using the institutions and practices of the FARC in Colombia as a case study, 
I suggest four elements to a rebel rule of law whereby the administration of justice 
 
247. Id. 
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must 1. be part of a broader system of governance, 2. be carried in a regular fashion, 
3. include some minimum elements of procedural fairness, and 4. rest of a narrative 
of social justice. 
The rule of law is a concept that situates the administration of justice within a 
broader framework of legitimacy and accountability in the exercise of public 
authority. It seems difficult to imagine a system of justice that could correspond to 
the aspirations of the rule of law if it operates in isolation from other components 
of public governance. This does not necessarily correspond to a “state-within-a-
state” established by an armed opposition group. The FARC in Colombia is a good 
illustration of the complex nature of rebel governance, described earlier as 
corresponding to a dual strategy of instrumentalization and marginalization of 
official powers.248 Where the government was absent or weaker, the FARC would 
assume powers more broadly, consistently, and institutionally, but always 
incorporating community actors. Where the government had a strong foothold, the 
FARC would undermine and influence state authorities to orient them in a manner 
consonant with the rebels’ priorities. In all cases, a web of relations was established 
between the FARC and the population covering many facets of life. This web of 
social relations is what constituted, for a segment of the population, the FARC as a 
legitimate actor to whom individuals could turn to resolve disputes. Indeed, as 
expressed by some insurgent leaders, the FARC was drawn into the administration 
of justice in a rather organic fashion, by its mere presence and power, contributing 
to the legitimacy and stature of the group within the population. Conversely, their 
administration of justice could be a burden, and failure to discharge it in a manner 
that was felt to be adequate by the community could have undermined their 
authority and, as a result, their strategic effectiveness. 
This is related to a certain presence of armed groups in a certain territory which 
allowed them to exert some authority continuously. This is not to say that the rebels 
must necessarily control the territory, meaning that they can exclude government 
presence. In Colombia, as in many other civil wars, the government was most often 
present in some way, not rarely concomitantly with the rebels.249 Even if there was 
state military presence, the FARC could withdraw but still be virtually present: if 
one needed to find the FARC, for instance to bring a dispute, there were often 
known ways to reach them.250 Not all non-state armed groups engage in this type 
of governance. One extreme example of a group not engaged in governance is the 
Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, which appears to live off the population 
 
248. I rely in this Section upon the findings described in Sections II.A.ii and II.B.iii, above, 
without repeating all the sources cited therein. 
249. ARJONA, supra note 1, at 174–75. 
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territory but whose courts had a “jurisdiction” that extended even beyond, with civilians in government-
controlled areas frequently crossing into LTTE territory to file complaints in LTTE courts. MAMPILLY, 
supra note 7, at 119. 
First to Printer_Provost (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:43 AM 
2018] FARC JUSTICE: REBEL RULE OF LAW 269 
 
 
through terror and kidnapping rather than the sort of interactive engagement that 
underpins governance.251 
A second element of the rebel rule of law is a degree of stability and 
predictability in the application of rules. There are both normative and institutional 
dimensions to this element. Normatively, the administration of justice can be said 
to correspond to the rule of law if it sanctions the application of rules that are known 
or knowable to those to whom they are applied.252 This can mean either that the 
armed opposition group is sanctioning customary norms that exist within a given 
community, or that the group has issued its own rules. Although war is a practice 
of social disruption, it does not usually entirely displace social structures that 
preceded it, especially in civil wars. This can be the case as regards norms 
administered by rebels, corresponding to values shared between the rebels and the 
general population. In the case of the FARC, it is reported that many of the norms 
they incorporated into their administration of justice overlapped with peasant 
values, a reflection of the origins of the movement.253 At other times or in respect 
of specific questions, the rebels can issue directives imposing rules of behavior that 
must be complied with by the population. Whether these be about crimes, 
commerce, taxation, etc., they can be printed and nailed to trees or simply 
proclaimed orally during community meetings. Often produced by people without 
any legal training, they tend to be expressed in simple terms that are well-understood 
by everyone. Non-state armed groups in some other armed conflicts produced 
considerably more elaborate standards, including the LTTE in Sri Lankla which 
promulgated its own civil code and criminal code.254 In her extensive field work 
throughout Colombia, Arjona found that 90% of the time, civilians had a clear 
expectation of what the rebel rules were and how the group would behave.255 
The requirement of stability and predictability also has institutional 
implications. While the ideal of a permanent, public rebel judicial system is likely 
unattainable in a great number of armed conflict, the concept of the rule of law 
speaks to the need to inscribe the exercise of public authority in legal practices. As 
such, authority that is exercised without any predictable patterns of how and by 
whom decisions are made cannot be said to comport with the rule of law. For 
instance, the Colombian ELN in its early days was led by commanders who would 
order executions without any process for matters that reflected their own 
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253. Molano, supra note 85, at 334. 
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First to Printer_Provost (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:43 AM 
270 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:227 
 
 
impulses.256 The practice of the FARC evolved to be very different from this 
picture: even without standing institutions, there were known ways of getting the 
rebel group to become seized of a matter, either because of open meetings on 
market days or by passing word to “those in the know” who could alert the FARC. 
This is far from filing a motion to initiate an action, but it does convey a sense that 
justice—at least of a sort—was at hand when it was needed. In this sense, the rule 
of law supports individual agency by allowing people to plan their lives. 
The institutional and normative dimensions of the stability and predictability 
of justice lead to the third element of a rebel rule of law: a minimum degree of 
fairness in the way in which decisions are made. What due process requirements 
are, in the context of the rebel administration of justice, is a complex question that 
cannot be fully explored here. A full answer would require a thorough exploration 
of the applicability of international human rights obligations to non-state armed 
groups as well as an articulation of due process rules in the very particular context 
of the administration of justice on the battlefield. Inevitably, it would enlarge the 
concept of the rule of law to the thicker end of the spectrum described earlier, at 
which human rights and the rule of law become fused. In keeping with the 
announced ambition to articulate here a thin version of the rebel rule of law, four 
implications of the requirement of fairness can be suggested, all reflecting the idea 
that the exercise of authority must be constrained by rules. A first implication is 
that rules bind not only those subject to authority but also those who wield it.257 It 
reflects a necessary reciprocity between the governed and the governing whereby 
there is a general expectation on the part of the population that the armed 
opposition group will abide by its own standards.258 The fact that, for the FARC as 
well as for many other armed groups, the administration of justice grew organically 
from internal discipline to a more public form of justice is one way in which the 
rules applicable to the population and those applicable to the group are connected. 
The possibility of complaining to rebel leadership of the behavior of a member or 
even of the group, as did occur at least in some occasions in Colombia, is another 
indication of this element of reciprocity. A second implication is that the established 
practices or institutions to administer justice be marked by some degree of 
impartiality. This does not mean neutrality, as the rebel administration of justice can 
surely reflect the broad governance objectives of the armed group just as official 
justice does that of the state. On the other hand, it means that rules must be applied 
in a spirit of objectivity as opposed to simply giving effect to preferences of the 
decider. It is not rare, in non-international armed conflicts, for tribal connections of 
a party to a dispute to have a decisive influence on the outcome. The study of FARC 
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governance in Colombia does not suggest that this is the case there, but its presence 
would be in tension with the requirements of the rule of law. A related implication 
is the need to listen to all sides of a dispute before reaching a decision. Again, many 
informers on FARC administration of justice confirm that the principle of audi 
alteram partem is part of the regular decision-making process of the group.259 FARC 
commanders remarked on the importance of fact-finding more broadly, including 
the possibility of calling other witnesses and going to inspect the evidence if it 
cannot be brought to the hearing. Finally, fairness speaks to the need for a resolution 
of the legal issue that is clear and final. The FARC often issued written decisions to 
ensure that there be no further disputes, and at times these were even entered into 
official ledgers of community dispute settlement mechanisms.260 In some cases, the 
FARC allowed for the possibility of an appeal of a decision, including in cases where 
the death penalty was imposed for a serious crime.261 Otherwise, there is a sense 
that it was unwise to ignore a decision by the FARC, for sanction could be quick 
and harsh. 
The fourth and final element of the rebel rule of law is discursive: the armed 
opposition group must relate its administration of justice to objectives that are 
consonant with social justice. Not all armed non-state actors claim the mantel of 
justice when exercising public authority. Some may have an approach that is more 
overtly predatory, as in the example of the Lord’s Resistance Army mentioned 
earlier, and others may feel distrust of the local population that they wish to keep at 
bay rather than engage by way of justice mechanisms, as the Rwanda Patriotic Front 
reportedly did during its initial takeover of Rwanda.262 In two decisions, the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone found that accountability mechanisms established by non-
state armed groups aimed primarily to maintain internal discipline, and had very 
little or nothing to do with a wish to sanction international criminal law or to act on 
the basis of moral, ethical, or religious opposition to behavior that amounts to 
violations of the laws of war.263 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan suggested that 
the rule of law should apply to any institution that seeks to promote it, and perhaps 
we should add only to them.264 If, as advanced by Rod Macdonald, “as a technique 
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of social ordering, law is the endeavour of symbolizing human conduct as governed 
by rules,” then it is fundamental that the rebel group itself partake in this 
symbolizing effort.265 Each armed insurgency produces its own justificatory 
narrative which is, more often than not, couched in terms that evoke social justice—
this is certainly the case for the FARC in Colombia, as described earlier. This 
element of the rule of law amounts to an invitation to non-state armed groups to 
inscribe their exercise of public authority into such social justice narratives. 
CONCLUSION 
The survey of the administration of justice by the FARC in Colombia suggests 
that this form of rebel governance is not necessarily incompatible in all its aspects 
with the concept of the rule of law. The latter is sufficiently fluid and flexible to 
allow for a meaningful application of its fundamental elements to the rebel 
administration of justice, to nudge it in the direction of practices that are evolving 
towards the progressive realization of the aspirations of the rule of law. This does 
not necessarily imply the legitimization of the cause embraced by an armed 
opposition group such as the FARC, nor of its practices. In this sense, the rebel rule 
of law operates a function similar to the rule of law more generally when it is applied 
to the administration of justice by a state: it does not bring with it the condoning of 
the state or of its actions, quite the opposite since the rule of law is usually 
brandished to castigate a government for its failures in this regard. One difference 
is that states have a full international legal personality and are presumed competent 
to fulfil their legal obligations, although lack of resources and other externalities 
may excuse incomplete performance. Armed groups, on the other hand, have a legal 
personality that is only partial, and the idea of the rebel rule of law can be a tool to 
determine what their obligations should be, in addition to whether they have been 
met. 
Governments fighting against armed opposition groups are eager to 
delegitimize every facet of the insurgency, and thus to dissociate whatever form of 
rebel de facto governance from any notion of justice or law. While there are sound 
political and even legal reasons for these governments to do so, in following their 
lead we deprive ourselves of both a yardstick by which to measure and criticize the 
practices of non-state armed groups and a tool with which to engage in a dialogue 
with the groups to encourage them to alter their behavior. The work of 
organizations like the ICRC and Geneva Call have established with unimpeachable 
clarity that humanitarian engagement with armed rebels is feasible and potentially 
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transformative, and the study of the FARC suggests that this can be so for the 
administration of justice as well.266 
The suggestion of a rebel rule of law has further implications for transitional 
justice. If a non-state armed group exerts significant control over parts of national 
territory for long periods of time and runs justice mechanisms, like the FARC in 
Colombia, then it will have created facts on the ground that will be nigh impossible 
to overlook or undo. It is remarkable that the discussions of the peace process in 
Colombia do not seem to have envisaged what will be the legal status of monetary 
awards, land titles, and a myriad of other decisions issued by FARC-driven 
processes. The end of armed conflict, just as its onslaught, can be a form of social 
disruption. There are examples of countries in which a principled approach was 
developed to assess which types of rebel judgments should stand and others be 
declared void, including a series of decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court after the 
end of the Civil War in relation to decision of Confederate courts.267 The Supreme 
Court thus held in Texas v. White that decisions “necessary to peace and good order” 
would stand, and those “in furtherance or support of the rebellion” would not.268 
The rebel rule of law provides a broader framing device to develop such a principled 
approach at the international level. 
In a very different context, discussing ways to limit the powers of the President 
of the United States, Bradley and Morrison suggested that the mere fact of having 
lawyers make arguments grounded in legality could produce an internalization of its 
concepts and ultimately exert some pull to comply.269 Even if the invocation of a 
legal precept is merely a conceit, it carries what John Elster described as “the 
civilizing force of hypocrisy,” initiating a dialogue on a basis that will always owe 
something to earlier statements, however hypocritical.270 The rebel rule of law 
likewise can play this civilizing influence, however slowly and unevenly bringing the 
administration of justice by armed opposition groups closer to the ideals of the rule 
of law. 
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